Operation Weserübung
Operation Weserübung (German: Unternehmen „Weserübung“) was the codename for the German military operation based on the plan (Fall Weserübung from 27 January 1940) to occupy Norway (Weserubung Nord) and Denmark (Weserubung Süd) , which was implemented by the Wehrmacht from 9 April to 10 June 1940. The name comes from the German for "Operation Weser Exercise", the Weser being a German river that merges into the North Sea.
Following the United Kingdom and France declaring war on Germany on 3 September 1939 and plunging Europe and the world into World War II, the military-political leadership of Germany had to be ahead of England and France in all events, and when they were discovered to be planning an invasion of Norway to cut off German iron ore supplies and to interfere with German shipping on the pretext of aiding Finland after its invasion by the Soviet Union action was required. It was a natural assumption that this activity would almost certainly spread to Denmark which controlled the entrance to the Baltic sea.
However, after the Soviet defeat of Finland, the Anglo-French military-political leadership did not abandon their plans for Scandinavia. A blockade could create great strategic difficulties for the German forces. Germany therefore had no other choice but to intervene and engage.
Contents
History
Fall Weserübung
All European countries with land borders always had strategic contingency defensive or offensive (or both) plans drawn up in case of war (i.e. the Schlieffen Plan). Following the British and French declarations of war against Germany on 3 September 1939, it became immediately apparent to Germany that their invaluable and essential supplies of Swedish iron ore, which were shipped by sea from northern ports in Norway could be at risk. However, Norway[2] and Sweden[3] were declared firmly neutral countries by their governments[4]. Nevertheless with what was at stake, German plans for the invasion of Norway were laid down in case of necessity, and Fall Weserübung was set forth as a 'directive' by Hitler on 1 March 1940 as a contingency measure.[5]
- On 14 December 1939, Hitler commissioned the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) to prepare a preliminary study for an invasion of Norway. This was called “Studie Nord” (English: Study North) and was completed at the end of December. On 10 January 1940, it was forwarded to the commanders-in-chief of the various Wehrmacht offices for detailed analysis. The high commands of the army and air force, who were completely absorbed by the planning of the operation ordered by Hitler in the West, produced only a brief study. The Kriegsmarine, on the other hand, developed a more detailed version between 14 and 19 January 1940, which was presented to Hitler on 20 January 1940. Two key success factors were identified:
- 1. Surprise to minimize Norwegian resistance and Britain's ability to intervene.
- 2. Use of warships for troop transport; This was intended to make it possible to compensate for the limited operating radius of air transport while at the same time occupying a large number of landing points.
- On 23 January 1940, Hitler ordered the establishment of a special staff within the OKW. On 27 January 1940, the plan was named "Fall Weserübung" (English: Case Weser Exercise ). The special staff was formed on 5 February 1940 under the leadership of Captain at Sea Theodor Krancke and was given the task of carrying out detailed operational planning. The special staff included officers from the army, air force and navy. The high commands of the three branches of the Wehrmacht, however, were not directly included in the planning.
- After the so-called Altmark Incident in mid-February 1940, Hitler ordered planning to be accelerated and on 21 February 1940 transferred it to a corps command, Group XXI under the leadership of General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst. On 26 February 1940, the OKW issued the relevant instructions to General von Falkenhorst, and his staff began planning on the same day. Liaison officers for the air force and navy were integrated, including Captain at Sea Krancke. On 1 March 1940, Hitler issued operational instructions[6]. In particular, this provided for the resources of the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe to be subordinated to Group XXI in order to ensure uniformity of leadership. However, this order was not implemented due to resistance, especially from the overburdened Luftwaffe under Hermann Göring.[7]
The reasons for this were manifold. German military intelligence warned that Britain and France had no intention of respecting neutral countries[8] In February 1940 British breaches of Norwegian neutrality occurred, notably large British warships attacking and boarding the unarmed civilian oil transport steamer Altmark[9], and the torpedoing and sinking in Norwegian territorial waters of three German ships, the Rio de Janeiro, Kreta, and Posedonia all in Norwegian territorial waters[10]. In the case of the Altmark it was in the company of a Norwegian navy coastal defence vessel. The Norwegians were angered that their neutrality had been infringed by the British, as they did not want to be dragged into the war. Nonetheless, the incident sowed doubts about Norwegian neutrality among the Allies and in Germany. Following pre-emptive German invasion of Norway, documents found in numerous British Consuls' offices showed that despite Norway's stated neutrality, the British were planning to invade Norway almost from the start of the European war and that they had a closely-meshed net of espionage developed in Norway. Churchill admitted quite candidly that Britain's chief aim was to draw Norway and Sweden into the war.[11]
Using assistance to Finland following the invasion of that country by the Soviet Union in the First Winter War as a rationale, the Allied Supreme War Council decided on 5 February 1940 to invade Norway. Initial plans were for a landing at Narvik and other ports, and success would rely on the acquiescence of Norway and Sweden. On March 2nd the British Minister at Oslo handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister (Koht) a demand to the effect that the Norwegian Government permit Allied troops to land and cross Norwegian territory en-route for Finland. A similar demand was made of the Swedish Government. This however, was abruptly destroyed as an excuse when Finland and Russia signed a Peace Treaty on March 13th. The British had begun embarking a military force that day to Norway but it was recalled and the operation cancelled.
On March 25th the Norwegian Minister in London called the attention of the British Government to incidents in which Norwegian neutrality had been infringed, including instances of the violation of territorial waters by Royal Navy warships. The Norwegian Foreign Minister stated that Norway's neutrality will be enforced and that Britain had been notified that the order to open fire had been given to Norwegian anti-aircraft units and the navy[12]
On March 28th, the Allies decided to mine Norwegian waters (Operation Wilfred) and this was complete by April 7th[13]. The Allies assumed that 'Wilfred' would provoke a German response in Norway and prepared a separate operation known as Plan R 4 to occupy Narvik and other important locations. The plan had been presented to the British Cabinet in November 1939 by Winston Churchill, as a means of retaliation against German minelaying. 'Wilfred', he argued, would force German convoys transporting Swedish iron ore into international waters, where they could be attacked by the Royal Navy. It was nevertheless a gross breach of Norway's neutrality.
On April 2nd Operation Weserübung was formally ordered into operation for April 9th. Given the overwhelming superiority of the Royal Navy, the absolute secrecy of all German measures was a prerequisite for success.[14] In order to be able to deceive enemy intelligence services, the warship crews intended to carry out the operation, the army and air force units and the crews of the merchant ships required for supply had to be left in the dark about the true intentions of the German leadership. The secrecy went so far that the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring, was not informed until April 1st.
On 4 April 1940, Colonel Hans Oster from the German Army Intelligence Office (Abwehr) of the OKW (Wehrmacht High Command) incautiously revealed the operation to the Dutch military attaché, Major Bert Sas, who immediately passed on this knowledge to the Danish naval attaché, Frigate Captain Frits A. Kjølsen, as well as to the Norwegians who may even have passed it on to British diplomats.
On 5 April 1940, France and Great Britain notified Norway of their [illegal] reservation of the right to deny Germany access to Norwegian and Swedish resources. This caused grave concern in Sweden[15] Three days later British troops who were intended to occupy Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik had already embarked and left their British harbours. However on April 9th the German counter-invasion took place and some fierce fighting ensued. On April 8th the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) issued a solemn statement condemning British military activities in Norway.[16]
Operation Weserübung
Admiral Rolf Carls was responsible for the preparations of the naval operation, Vice Admiral Otto Schniewind played a key role in developing the plans and Admiral Alfred Saalwächter had tactical command of Operation Weserübung. The invasion force departed Bremerhaven early on 8 April 1940 with Captain Friedrich Rieve aboard Karlsruhe commanding.
When it arrived at Kristiansand, heavy fog covered the area, making the passage of the fjord outside the harbor very hazardous. As a result, the German ships had to wait until the morning of 9 April to begin the attack. As Karlsruhe entered the fjord, she came under heavy fire from the Norwegian coastal guns at Odderøya Fortress. The cruiser turned in the fjord to bring her full broadside into action; the artillery duel lasted for about two hours before heavy fog again covered the port, forcing both sides to cease fire. The Norwegians surrendered an hour later, and the German ships landed their embarked troops. Karlsruhe then left Kristiansand on the evening of 9 April with three of the torpedo boats as escorts. Unknown to the Germans, the British submarine HMS Truant was positioned outside the fjord, and when her crew spotted the German ships she fired a spread of torpedoes. Karlsruhe took evasive action, but one torpedo struck her on the starboard side amidships, blasting a large hole in the hull and allowing thousands of tons of water to flood in. The flooding disabled her engines and electrical generators, which cut off power to the pumps that were trying to keep pace with the incoming water. With those pumps inoperable, Rieve decided there was no hope of saving Karlsruhe and issued the order to abandon ship two hours after the attack. The torpedo boat Greif took off her crew and fired two more torpedoes into Karlsruhe to scuttle her.
The German flotilla steamed on at a speed of 12 knots (22 km/h; 14 mph). Shortly after midnight (Norwegian time) on 9 April 1940, an order from the Commanding Admiral to extinguish all lighthouses and navigation lights was broadcast over the NRK (Norsk rikskringkasting) [Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation]. The German ships had been ordered to fire only in the event they were directly fired on first. Between 00:30 and 02:00, the flotilla stopped and 150 infantrymen of the landing force were transferred to the escorts R17 and R21 (from Emden) and R18 and R19 (from Blücher). At 04:34 two torpedoes from a concealed and unknown battery at the Oscarsborg fortress scored hits on the heavy cruiser Blücher. The ship had been severely damaged, but had successfully passed through the firing zone; most of the Norwegian guns could no longer bear on her. The 15 cm guns in the Kopås battery were all standing in open positions with a wide sector of firing, and they were still within range. After passing the gun batteries, the crew, including the personnel manning the guns, were tasked with fighting the fire. By that time she had taken on a list of 18 degrees, although this was not initially problematic. The fire eventually reached one of the ship's 10.5 cm ammunition magazines between turbine room 1 and turbine room 2/3, which exploded violently. The blast ruptured several bulkheads in the engine rooms and ignited the ship's fuel stores. The battered ship slowly began to capsize at 07:22 and the order to abandon ship was given. Blücher, with almost 1,600 men crew, rolled over and sank at 07:30, with significant casualties. Some sources report that up to 830 crew members and army soldiers of the landing command died, although these numbers have not been completely substantiated to this day. However, the naval historian Jürgen Rohwer writes in his book Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (Annapolis 2005) that 125 crew members and 195 army soldiers were KIA. The survivors had to avoid the burning oil slick, which killed several of the crew. The remaining crew members escaped to the island. The commander Woldag and the first officer, frigate captain Erich Heymann, also survived the sinking. Bodies continued to emerge from the wreck for weeks and were recovered and buried by the Norwegians in coffins provided.
On 10 April 1940, the air raid alarm was raised again at 7:30 a.m. Two squadrons of British Blackburne Scua bombers (normally carrier-based) from Hatston base in the Orkney Islands attacked the port of Bergen. The total of 15 planes were able to penetrate the German anti-aircraft fire and score three hits and three close-range hits on the "Königsberg". The hits caused serious fires and the failure of electrical equipment. The ship capsized at 10:51 a.m.[17]
German forces were able to locate and slip through the mines Britain had laid around Norwegian ports, and local Norwegian garrisons were ordered to allow the Germans to land unopposed. The order came from a Norwegian commander loyal to Norway’s former Foreign Minister Vidkun Quisling. Hours after the landing, the German Minister in Oslo asked for Norway’s surrender. The Norwegian government refused, and the Germans responded with a landing of paratroopers as well as Gebirgsjäger (only after one of the two Norwegian old coastal armoured ships lying off Narvik was sunk could German mountain troops be brought ashore) and the establishment of a government led by Quisling. Some Norwegian forces refused to accept German rule and continued to fight. The German victory was complete[18].
In Denmark, the Danish army intelligence service was informed of German troop concentrations through its agents in Holstein and passed this information on to their government. However, this news was not taken seriously by the government. The element of surprise had its full effect to the great advantage of the German troops under General der Flieger Leonhard Kaupisch, commanding General of the Höheres Kommando z. b. V. XXXI. His Chief of Staff, Major-General Kurt Himer, was already in Copenhagen on April 7th, disguised as a civilian on a diplomatic mission for a meeting at the German Embassy. For the first time, German paratroopers made combat jumps from the Junkers Ju 52. At 4:35 a.m., German paratroopers jumped south of Vordingborg and occupied the Storstrømsbroen bridge. A little later there was another jump to occupy Aalborg Airport.
- Military history finds few examples of nations and armed forces that consistently excel in maneuver warfare based upon speed, focus, decentralized execution, high levels of initiative, and strong small-unit leadership. The German military in World War II was such an organization. It is credited, in particular, with mastering the operational level of war. But one brilliant operation, the invasion of Scandinavia in 1940, has almost been reduced to a historical footnote. That campaign, recorded as an outstanding example of maneuver warfare at the operational level, is also the first joint operation that involved significant land, sea, and air forces fighting under unified command. Because it preceded the better-known Gelb attack on the Low Countries by just one month, the invasion of Scandinavia (codenamed Operation Weserübung) has received scant attention from most historians. Nevertheless, it is still worth studying by practitioners of the operational art since it is replete with examples of successfully implemented tenets of maneuver-based doctrine. It also demonstrates the importance of The German military genius for maneuver warfare is well illustrated by an often overlooked operation of World War II, the invasion of Scandinavia in 1940. Operation Weserübung also warrants examination because it was joint in execution and demonstrates that the German army, navy, and air force—Wehrmacht, Kriegsmarine, and Luftwaffe—could fight as a team even if rivalry among the headquarters of the services made Hitler the operation’s unified commander by fault. A combination of speed, surprise, and daring enabled the German armed forces to defy the Royal Navy by transporting troops directly to their objectives along the Norwegian coast. Furthermore, quickness and dash baffled the hapless Norwegians and beleaguered Allied forces. The lessons of this operation were not lost on the British for the balance of the war and remain relevant today as a case study in joint warfare and the operational art.
- In this operation, Germany employed a joint force of army, navy, and air force units in a centrally planned, simultaneous assault, along multiple avenues of approach and against numerous key objectives. Execution was highly decentralized, with a minimal need for excessive command and control structures that are the hallmark of modern military organizations. Furthermore, the assigned objectives accurately identified and exploited Allied centers of gravity. Pitting strength against weakness, the Germans crushed the Danes in one day and destroyed Norwegian resistance in less than two months, despite the arrival of a sizable number of British and French troops. This stunning success was based on a few simple factors. First, the Germans had good intelligence that led to accurate appreciations of enemy strengths and weaknesses thereby enabling them to focus on critical enemy vulnerabilities. Second, they applied their strengths—including airpower, surprise, and well-led professional forces—against Allied weaknesses such as timid commanders, ineffective mobilization systems, and a vulnerable command and control network. Third, the bold use of German warships to carry troops to their objectives in the teeth of the Royal Navy led directly to operational success in the campaign. Fourth, Norwegian regular forces were outnumbered, ill-equipped, poorly organized and led, and generally neglected. Simultaneous multiple blows aimed at key points throughout the country paralyzed the Norwegian decisionmaking structure, thus allowing early successes against unprepared defenders. Finally, the German invasion of France in May 1940 forced the Allies (British, French, and a smattering of Poles) to entirely pull out of Norway in an effort to stave off disaster on the Western Front. This final element, essentially based on good fortune, saved beleaguered German forces at Narvik and permitted the Germans to complete their conquest of Norway.[19]
The Kriegsmarine under Erich Raeder lost 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 10 destroyers as well as various U-boats, transports and smaller warships. Norway lost 116 ships lost, the Royal Navy lost 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, 7 destroyers, 1 submarine as well as various transports and smaller warships. The French Navy lost 1 destroyer and 1 submarine, the Polish Navy 1 destroyer and 1 submarine.
Battles (excerpt)
On 9 April 1940, at the climax of the Phoney War, German warships entered major Norwegian ports, from Narvik (defended by 25,000 Allied soldiers) to Oslo, deploying thousands of German troops under the supreme command of Nikolaus von Falkenhorst (he had developed and introduced the first plan to Hitler on 20 February 1940) and occupying Norway. At the same time, German forces occupied Copenhagen, among other Danish cities. King Christian X surrendered almost immediately. The Danes had lost only 26 men, another 23 were wounded. The Germans had 20 men KIA and 65 wounded. During the operation in April 1940, smaller Brandenburger commandos were deployed to secure strategic objects in Denmark and Norway. This was considered a general rehearsal of this young elite for the Western Campaign.
The X. Fliegerkorps was commanded by Hans Ferdinand Geisler. In the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe had assigned all flying units intended for the conquest of Norway to the corps. The X. Fliegerkorps was active there from April 1940 onwards to occupy the country and combat Allied naval operations. This demonstrated for the first time the superiority of air supremacy over sea supremacy. To put it simply, the Luftwaffe, through the 10th Air Corps, dominated the airspace over the Norwegian sea area, while the Royal Navy dominated the Norwegian Sea. The ship losses caused by German aircraft made it impossible for the Royal Navy to remain permanently in Norwegian waters and so German air supremacy in the Norwegian battle area contributed greatly to German success.
The First Battle of Narvik (Schlacht um Narvik) on 10 April 1940 occurs when a British force of five destroyers enters Ofotfjord. The Germans have ten destroyers defending and both sides lose two ships, with the German force suffering greater damage beyond that to other vessels. At Bergen, the German cruiser Königsberg is sunk by air attack (18 KIA, 12 severly wounded, 11 slightly wounded). In Oslo, the Norwegian government has left, and Vidkun Quisling becomes the head of the new government. Luftwaffe bombers attack the town of Nybergsund at 17:00 on 11 April 1940. It also bombed the town of Elverum. Kongsberg falls to German forces without a fight 12 April 1940.
The Second Battle of Narvik on 13 April 1940 occurs when a British force of nine destroyers and the battleship HMS Warspite enter Ofotfjord and destroy all eight defending German destroyers. On 14 April 1940, British forces (a party of Royal Marines) land at Namsos and Harstad as Anglo-French forces prepare to launch operations against German forces at Trondheim and Narvik. On the same day, German paratroopers make a combat jump at Dombås and block the rail and road network in southern Norway for five days before being forced to surrender by the Norwegian Army on 19 April. On 15 April 1940, Vidkun Quisling resigns. His replacement is Ingolf Christensen.
On 18 April 1940, the British 148th Brigade lands at Åndalsnes and the French 5th Demi-Brigade of Chasseurs-Alpins (mountain troops) lands at Namsos. On the next day, the British 146th Brigade is forced to withdraw from Steinkjer by German forces. German air raids on 20 April 1940 ruin Namsos harbour for Allied landing purposes. German forces moving north from Oslo reach Lillehammer and capture the town the next day. German forces engage the British 148th Brigade north of Lillehammer on 22 April 1940, on the next day, the British 15th Brigade lands at Åndalsnes/Gudbrandsdal and moves to relieve the 148th Brigade. On 24 April 1940, German forces are besieged at Narvik, with landings planned to facilitate the capitulation of the garrison.
The next day, German forces successfully continue to push back Allied forces in the Gudbrandsdal north of Lillehammer. Norwegian forces conduct attacks on the Germans at Narvik. Allied forces retreat from Namsos and Åndalsnes on 27 April 1940, abandoning the effort against German forces at Trondheim. On the next day, French mountain troops arrive at Harstad but are quickly defeated. On 29 April 1940, King Haakon and the Norwegian government evacuate Molde and flee to Tromsø. German forces from the south link up with the Trondheim force. Allied evacuations begin at Åndalsnes on 30 April 1940.
Fate of the German destroyers
For the invasion of Norway, the naval command had put together five groups of warships. Warship Group 1 intended for Narvik consisted of ten destroyers. 200 Gebirgsjäger (mountain infantry soldiers) from the 139th Mountain Infantry Regiment under Colonel Alois Windisch were embarked on each destroyer. Warship Group 2, destined for Trondheim, consisted of the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper under Hellmuth Heye and four destroyers. On 7 April 1940, at 3:00 a.m., warship groups 1 and 2 had began sailing north together from the German Bight under the protection of the battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. It was the largest fleet that the Navy was ever able to put together for an offensive operation during the Second World War. At 2:30 p.m. the formation was unsuccessfully attacked by twelve Wellington bombers of the Royal Air Force.
On the night of 7 to 8 April 1940, the battle groups broke through the narrows between the Shetlands and the mountains to the north. That night the wind from the southwest picked up significantly and reached wind forces of 7 to 8. Since the destroyers were unable to maintain a speed of 26 knots in the increasing swell, connection to nine destroyers was lost during the night. Warship Group 1 reached Narvik as planned during the Weser period. The coastal armored ships Eidsvold and Norge, whose commanders wanted to offer resistance, were torpedoed and sunk in front of and in the Narvik harbor basin by the destroyers Z 21 Wilhelm Heidkamp and Z 11 Bernd von Arnim. Narvik's site commander, Colonel Sundlo, surrendered the city without resistance. For the leader of the destroyers (Führer der Zerstörer), Commodore Friedrich Bonte, the problem of the return march arose because of the two planned tankers only the Jan Wellem had reached Narvik. Although the tanker's load was sufficient, taking over the oil was so time-consuming that the delivery time specified in the operational order on the evening of 9 April 1940 could not be met. On the morning of 10 April, a British destroyer flotilla advanced to the harbor in Narvik and sank two of the German destroyers, the leader boat Z 21 Wilhelm Heidkamp and Z 22 Anton Schmitt. Commodore Bonte was killed in action. During their retreat, the British ships encountered renewed resistance in the form of a destroyer flotilla led by Frigate Captain Erich Bey, now the new leader of the destroyers, and lost their lead ship, the flotilla leader HMS Hardy and the destroyer HMS Hunter. The battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau took over long-range security at sea and met the British battlecruiser HMS Renown here.
The Gneisenau received a direct hit in the artillery control center on the Vormars platform. The German ships broke off the battle and returned to Wilhelmshaven a few days later. On 13 April 1940, there was another battle off Narvik with a British fleet led by Vice-Admiral William Jock Whitworth, when the British battleship HMS Warspite with the destroyers HMS Icarus, HMS Hero, HMS Foxhound, HMS Kimberley, HMS Forester, HMS Bedouin, HMS Punjabi, HMS Eskimo and HMS Cossack advanced to the berths of the German ships. During the course of the battle, HMS Warspite, HMS Bedouin and HMS Eskimo sank Z 13 Erich Koellner, while HMS Cossack and HMS Foxhound sank Z 12 Erich Giese. The HMS Hero torpedoed Z 18 Hans Lüdemann. The remaining German destroyers were either run aground or scuttled by their crews after their fuel and ammunition supplies were exhausted.
The Erich Giese's castaways, who were in the water, were shot at, which is a war crime. Some of the British destroyers were also seriously damaged, but none were sunk. HMS Punjabi received artillery hits and HMS Eskimo lost her forecastle to a torpedo hit from Z 2 Georg Thiele. The HMS Cossack was badly damaged by artillery hits from Z 17 Dieter von Roeder and ran aground on a wreck. The Warspite's onboard aircraft sank the German submarine U 64. An attack by U 25 against the British fleet on 13 April 1940 and another attack by U 25 and U 48 in Vestfjord against the battleship Warspite on 14 April 1940 were unsuccessful due to Torpedo failures. On 14 April 1940, the heavy cruiser HMS Suffolk sank the German supply tanker Skagerrak (6044 GRT) northwest of Bodø.
Narvik
As part of the operation on 9 April 1940, around four in the morning, ten German destroyers entered the Ofotfjord, at the eastern end of which was the pier for Swedish iron ore. On board the destroyers were the 139th Mountain Infantry Regiment and some divisional units of the 3rd Mountain Division; Lieutenant General Eduard Dietl personally took command. After a battle with a Norwegian ironclad (coastal armored ship), the approximately 2,000 mountain troops were able to occupy the harbor largely without a fight.
The plan seemed to work, the strategically important loading station for the ore relevant to the war economy (the most important reason for the German attack on Norway) seemed secured. But only until the morning of 10 April 1940. Because then five British destroyers opened fire on the German ships. The battle ended with heavy losses for both sides: two ships each were sunk and five German destroyers were damaged. But while the Royal Navy could easily replace such losses, they represented a bitter loss for the German Navy – almost a third of all available destroyers were put out of action.
And worse was to come: On 13 April 1940, the British battleship HMS Warspite entered the Ofotfjord. It was an older ship, commissioned in 1915 – but it could still easily destroy any destroyer. In the battle that followed, the remaining eight German destroyers, some of which had already been damaged, were lost. But their crews were able to escape to land near Narvik. In addition to the 2,000 mountain troops, Dietl now also had 2,100 marines under his command. On 14 April 1940, 600 Fallschirmjäger (with Kriegsberichter or war correspondent Bruno von Kayser) joined them. However, this was of little use to him, because from mid-April Great Britain and France, with the approval of the Norwegian King Haakon VII, deployed their own troops ashore around Narvik. 12,000 men were to attack the place; If you add other units that landed in northern Norway, there were even 24,500 men. A fifth of them were ex-soldiers of the former Polish army, exactly 4,778 mountain troops. Fierce fighting now began between Dietl's troops around Narvik and the Allied units advancing from all sides.
As early as 17 April 1940, after the Warspite intervened, Hitler had officially given his general the option to withdraw, specifically: internment in neutral Sweden. But Dietl refused and instead dug in with his people on the railway line to the east. There he offered stalling resistance to the Allies, who were only hesitantly pushing forward. Given the balance of power, Narvik should actually have been the Wehrmacht's first defeat. But Dietl was doubly lucky in his gamble: Firstly, the two British commanders on site, Major General Pierse Joseph Mackesy and Admiral William Lord Cork, fell out – Pierse wanted to risk as little as possible, while Cork wanted to attack courageously. Secondly, the battle for Narvik quickly lost its importance for the Allies after the unexpected rapid advance of the Wehrmacht in the Western Campaign from 10 May 1940.
On 13 May 1940, 14 warships and transport ships arrive in Bjerkvik on the east bank of the Harjangen Fjord. Thousands of French mountain troops were disembarked and took the Elvegardsmoen camp. Their goal: Hunt and destroy Dietl. Dietl informed OKW through XXI Group that the situation at Narvik was critical. Dietl reported that his troops were too exhausted even to retreat southward towards the advancing relief columns. He planned to give up the city if the Allies persisted in their offensive and to hold a bridgehead on the railroad, but this would depend on speedy reinforcements, something the Germans had not anticipated. Otherwise, there was no alternative except to cross into Sweden and request internment. Group XXI requested permission for Dietl to do so should enemy action necessitate it. Hoping for a miracle, the 3rd Mountain Division (actually no more than a weak regiment by this time) prepared for the end.
- Dietl got his miracle. With pressure from XXI Group and OKW, Hitler approved limited reinforcements (Plan Gelb was underway by then and diverting large formations to Norway would draw strong opposition from his commanders in France). On 14 May, a token force of 66 paratroopers arrived. Over the next three weeks a parachute battalion and two companies of mountain infantry (hastily trained in parachute operations) were dropped into Narvik. These forces enabled Dietl to hold on long enough for the full weight of the invasion of the Low Countries to make itself felt on the Allies. Although finally compelled to give up Narvik to vastly superior forces on 28 May, the remnants of 3rd Mountain Division continued to fight astride the Kiruna rail line.
The French were heavily armed and supported by naval artillery. The Germans of the Nordgruppe (northern gorup), with only rifles and a few heavy machine guns, had to withdraw from Narvik. Many had fallen or were taken prisoners. They holed up at the ore railway. There was hardly any food and ammunition left. A thaw set in and the sledges were no longer usable, but that also applied to the pursuers. Reinforcements from the south (from Oslo, then Trondheim/Drontheim, then Namsos) under Generalleutnant Valentin Feurstein were underway, but that would take time. On 23 May 1940, the Arctic Circle was crossed. The Luftwaffe even trained Gebirgsjäger in parachute jumping during a five-day crash course and transported them to Dietl.
The last planned relief for the combat group north and east of Narvik was named Operation Büffel, mainly the 136th and 137th Mountain Jäger Regiments (Gebirgs-Jäger-Regiment 136 und 137). Lieutenant Colonel Georg Ritter von Hengl was leading his men, when the order from General von Falkenhorst arrived on 9 June 1940: Abort Operation Büffel (Dietl' nickname). But Ritter von Hengl allowed a young lieutenant and 31 men to march on. It was a matter of honour. They proudy reported to Dietl on 14 June 1940, four days after the end of the campaign and six after the recapture of Narvik (on 8 June 1940).[20][21]
The new commander of the Allied land forces, Lieutenant General Claude John Eyre Auchinleck, managed to occupy the now abandoned greater Narvik area with his French mountain troops on 28 May 1940 pushing the German Südgruppe (southern group) to the east, who had destroyed the ore railway and power lines before they retreated. But the decision to end the fight had already been made four days earlier in London. Norway's king, now in exile in Britain, was surprised by this decision – after all, there was a chance of inflicting a truly painful defeat on the Wehrmacht. But the collapse of the Allied Western Front and the impending catastrophe of the British army in Dunkirk made the involvement in Norway pointless.
- On 8 June 1940, the Allies secretly evacuated the Narvik area. The next day the Norwegian Command signed an armistice ending the fighting and giving Germany total control of Norway. The German reputation as an undefeated force remained intact and, in honor of their heroic stand, Dietl’s mountain troopers were awarded a sleeve device commemorating their service at Narvik during the battle.
Churchill's desperate goal was now to evacuate the bulk of the expeditionary force. From 4 to 8 June 1940, the Allied units withdrew from Narvik and the surrounding area. Dietl moved up with his mountain troops and sailors a few hours late. The strategically important port was again under German control. Hitler personally edited the success report that the Wehrmacht High Command published on 10 June 1940:
- “The heroic resistance that Lieutenant General Dietl's combat group has put up for many weeks in isolation under the most difficult conditions in Narvik against an overwhelming enemy force received its crowning achievement today through complete victory!”
Casualties and losses
Altogether, the German casualties during the “Weser Exercise” amounted to 1,317 KIA, 1,604 wounded and 2,375 missing (mostly on the high seas). The ship losses were very high. In addition to the brand new heavy cruiser Blücher the two 1927 light cruisers Karlsruhe and Königsberg as well as ten destroyers, a torpedo boat and four submarines were lost. According to naval historian Michael Salewski, the German fleet lost almost half of its surface forces. Among the supply ships, 30 German merchant ships with a total of 159,000 GRT were sunk, either running into mines or were captured. The Luftwaffe under Erhard Milch (Luftflotte 5), as of 10 May 1940 under Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, lost 242 aircraft.
Germany's enemies had a total of 6,844 death casualties (including the 26 killed Danes). 1,896 Britons, 1,335 Norwegians and 530 French and Poles each were KIA in the fighting on land, thousands were wounded. The Royal Navy lost the aircraft carrier HMS Glorious, the light cruiser HMS Curlew and the heavy cruiser HMS Effingham, as well as nine destroyers and six submarines, with a combined death toll of over 2,500 (c.4,400 British lost). British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in particular was accused of having been outmaneuvered in Norway. During the subsequent Norway debate, he lost the support of his own party, resigned, and was replaced as Prime Minister by the outsider, Winston Churchill.
War decorations
Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross (chronological)
- Otto Schniewind, Knight's Cross on 21 April 1940
- Karl Dönitz, Knight's Cross on 21 April 1940 (for all U-boat operations, but also for those during Weserübung)
- Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, Knight's Cross on 30 April 1940
- Erhard Milch, Knight's Cross on 4 May 1940
- Hans Ferdinand Geisler, Knight's Cross on 4 May 1940
- Martin Harlinghausen, Knight's Cross on 4 May 1940
- Werner Baumbach, Knight's Cross on 8 May 1940
- Gerhard Grenzel, Knight's Cross on 8 May 1940
- Martin Fiebig, Knight's Cross on 8 May 1940
- Paul-Werner Hozzel, Knight's Cross on 8 May 1940
- Martin Möbus, Knight's Cross on 8 May 1940
- Elmar Schäfer, Knight's Cross on 8 May 1940
- Erich Bey, Knight's Cross on 9 May 1940
- Eduard Dietl, Knight's Cross on 9 May 1940 (also the Oak Leaves on 19 July 1940, it was the first award of this grade)
- Erwin Engelbrecht, Knight's Cross on 9 May 1940
- Hermann Fischer, Knight's Cross on 9 May 1940
- Waldemar Gerlach, Knight's Cross on 9 May 1940
- Walter Klein, Knight's Cross on 9 May 1940
- Leopold Mattheß, Knight's Cross on 9 May 1940
- Richard Pellengahr, Knight's Cross on 9 May 1940
- Alfred Saalwächter, Knight's Cross on 9 May 1940
- Peter Ingenhoven, Knight's Cross on 11 May 1940
- Hans Bartels, Knight's Cross on 16 May 1940
- Martin Vetter, Knight's Cross on 16 May 1940
- Arthur Godenau, Knight's Cross on 31 May 1940
- Erich Grundmann, Knight's Cross on 31 May 1940
- Karl Jakob Rixecker, Knight's Cross on 31 May 1940
- Rolf Carls, Knight's Cross on 14 June 1940
- Klaus Hinkelbein, Knight's Cross on 14 June 1940 (for Weserübung and Battle of France)
- Günther Lütjens, Knight's Cross on 14 June 1940
- Hubert Schmundt, Knight's Cross on 14 June 1940
- Heinz Birnbacher, Knight's Cross on 17 June 1940
- Willi Schultz, Knight's Cross on 19 June 1940
- Franz Wieting, Knight's Cross on 19 June 1940
- Hans Rohr, Knight's Cross on 20 June 1940
- Hans von Schlebrügge, Knight's Cross on 20 June 1940
- Viktor Schönbeck, Knight's Cross on 20 June 1940
- Franz August Sorko, Knight's Cross on 20 June 1940
- Ludwig Stautner, Knight's Cross on 20 June 1940
- Alois Windisch, Knight's Cross on 20 June 1940
Narvik Shield
The Narvik Shield (German: Narvikschild) was a World War II German military decoration awarded to all German forces that took part in the battles of Narvik between 9 April and 8 June 1940. It was instituted on 19 August 1940 by Adolf Hitler. The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) published the order the same day. It was bestowed by General Eduard Dietl, the commander of Army Group Narvik. The award was the first of a series of arm shield campaign awards.
Awardees
A total of 8,577 personnel received the award. Specifically: 2,755 to the Army, 3,661 to the Kriegsmarine, and 2,161 to the Luftwaffe (which included the Fallschirmjäger).
KIA
The fallen of the battles of Narvik were awarded the shield posthumously. The decoration was presented to the bereaved family.
Further reading
- A Review of the Campaign in Norway, Royal Air Force (formerly "Secret"), April – June 1940 (Archive)
- Lars Borgersrud: On the Norwegian history tradition after Magne Skodvin on Quisling and the invasion of Norway in 1940 (Archive)
External links
Pictures
Films and audio
- Kampf um Norwegen – Feldzug 1940 by Martin Rikli and Dr. Werner Buhre (in German)
- Deutscher Rundfunk (Hans Fritzsche) – Kommentar zum Feldzug in Norwegen (in German)
- Weserübung and the sinking of "The Blücher", told from where it all happened, YouTube
References
- ↑ Firestorm: Norway (Archive)
- ↑ Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 by a large editorial committee, USA Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1954, Series D, vol.viii, p.603, no.503.
- ↑ German Documents, 1954, p.658-9, no.530.
- ↑ Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 by an editorial committee, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, London, 1956, Series D, vol.ix, p.65.
- ↑ German Documents, 1954, p.831-833, no.644.
- ↑ Not quite correct. Hitler issued a Directive concerning preparations only. This can be found in Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, vol.viii (1954), p.831-3, No.644.
- ↑ Jean-Paul Theler: "Weserübung" Norwegen 1940 – Eine Joint Operation, in "Schweizer Soldat", Issue 4, 2008
- ↑ German Foreign Office, German White Book No.4, Britain's Designs on Norway, USA, 1940, p.xviii, cites Churchill and other British Government Ministers on neutrality and them proposing to ignore it.
- ↑ German Documents, 1954, pps:776, 779-783 for the full report of the British Royal Navy attack who fired indiscriminately at the German crew, murdering six, seriously wounding three (one expected to die), seriously wounding another three who were expected to recover, and one missing, probably drowned.
- ↑ German Documents, 1956, p.101, no.63. The Rio had been sunk by the former Polish submarine Orzel off southern Norway at noon on April 8th.
- ↑ These evidences are republished in the 'German White Book No.4.
- ↑ German Documents, 1956, p.35n, no.17.
- ↑ German Documents, 1956, p.97-9, nos.58 & 60, for confirmation of the mining activities.
- ↑ German Documents, 1956, p.66-7, no.39.
- ↑ German Documents, 1956, p.81.
- ↑ German Documents, 1956, p.99, no.60.
- ↑ In 1941, work began on salvaging the "Königsberg".
- ↑ German Documents, 1956, pps:136-2139, no.95, gives a German Military Situation & Political Report as at April 11th.
- ↑ Major Dr. Richard D. Hooker, Jr. / Colonel Christopher Coglianese: Operation Weserubung and the Origins of Joint Warfare, 1993 (Archive)
- ↑ Major i. G. Zorn: Von Drontheim nach Narvik – Das Büffel-Unternehmen, 1940
- ↑ Das Unternehmen "Büffel" in Nordnorwegen, 1951