German East Africa

German East Africa Deutsch-Ostafrika
Capital		Bagamoyo (1885–1890) Dar es Salaam (1890–1916) Tabora (1916, temporary)
Currency		German East African rupie

German East Africa (German: Deutsch-Ostafrika) was established on 27 February 1885 with an imperial charter and as a Protectorate (Schutzgebiet) in 1891, as the German Empire belatedly began building its colonial empire. This did not include Zanzibar, which remained a British Protectorate. When Germany was stripped of its colonies at the end of World War I due to the diktat of the Treaty of Versailles (signed June 1919; enacted January 1920), a League of Nations mandate placed most of German East Africa under British administration in July 1922, and the territory was given the name Tanganyika.

A small portion in the west of the colony was mandated to Belgium and administered from the neighboring Belgian Congo as the territory of Ruanda-Urundi. The two former British territories, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, united in 1964, forming the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which later the same year was renamed the United Republic of Tanzania.

History

Green: German East Africa
Dark gray: Other German possessions
Darkest gray: German Empire (1911 borders)

Dr. phil. Carl Peters (1856–1918) with his black African batman; since the end of 1884, Peters had concluded agreements with local rulers on the East African mainland on behalf of the Society for German Colonization, from which the DOAG emerged, thereby establishing colonial claims. Modeled on British charters, Otto von Bismarck had the colonial society, renamed the German East African Society (DOAG), issue an imperial letter of protection covering the regions of Usagara, Nguru, Useguha and Ukami. This gave Peter's colonial association the necessary backing for further expansion.

Modern woman (German: moderne Frau) in the colony of German East Africa. Large plantations had to be worked by native labour, and the supply of that labour was a chief problem that the rulers of this territory had to face. Nevertheless, Governor Graf von Götzen reported proudly in 1904, that acreage under cotton cultivation had increased fivefold. Considerable numbers of natives were reported taking up cotton farming in the Tanga and Wilhelmstal districts.

The earliest written history of this part of east Africa is an Arabic chronicle, the Kilwa Kisiwani, which gives its history from the tenth century to the arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th century. According to this chronicle settlers first reached 'Kilwa' from Shiraz in Persia about 975AD. At the time of their arrival there were already other Arab settlements on adjacent islands. Interestingly, there was a certain amount of indirect commercial intercourse between East Africa and China. A Chinese geographical treatise of 1060 AD gives an uncomplimentary description of the land and people of Malina, just to the north of Mombassa. At the beginning of the fifteenth century several expeditions were sent from China to east Africa. Although none of these expeditions proceeded any further south than Malindi, Chinese coins dating as far back as 713 AD and Chinese porcelain have been discovered not only at Kilwa (the leading gold port for centuries), but also at many other bygone coastal settlements along the coast.

The authentic history of this region may be said to begin with the advent of the Portuguese in 1498 when Vasco da Gama called at Malindi and Mombasa. The first Portuguese to call at Kilwa was the discoverer of Brazil, Pedro Alvares Cabral, who arrived in the harbour with six ships on 16 July 1500. Another fleet arrived from Lisbon in 1501 but met with a cool reception from the inhabitants. On 12 July 1502 Vasco da Gama returned with a very large fleet and captured the Amir, Ibrahim, extorting from him a promise to acknowledge the King of Portugal as his overlord and to pay a tribute of 5,000 crusados. On 22 July 1505 the Portuguese again arrived with a powerful fleet, dethroned the Amir and installed a new Muslim Sultan in his place. They constructed a fort with a garrison of about 150 soldiers and some civil officers. This occupation lasted just over seven years. In 1513 they left. About 1585 what would become German East Africa was invaded by a cannibal tribe known as the Zimba. They devastated most of the country, including Kilwa (which never completely recovered), but were eventually defeated by another tribe, the Segeju, who also captured Mombassa in 1592 which they handed over to the Portuguese, who began erecting Fort Jesus. For a century thereafter the commanders of that fort claimed that the whole of the coast between Cape Delagdo and Cape Guardafui was subject to their control as representatives of the King of Portugal.

German dependency

"Buschiri Guns" by Ferdinand Lindner; Before Wissmann's troops even arrived in the country with the war correspondent Konrad Weidmann, the burden of the fighting lay with the German naval soldiers, who acted as marine infantry (Marine-Infanterie), which of course was also reported on. Only with their help was the German East African Company able to defend the coastal cities of Bagamoyo and Dar-es-Salaam.

“This picture appeared on 17 October 1891, when the slave trader revolt (Arab rebellion) had already ended. After the catastrophic defeat of Emil von Zelewski's expedition, which is belittled in the text as 'mishap'. During the Battle of Rugaro against the Wahehe near Iringa on 17 August 1891 the 14 Germans and their 320 Askari were ambushed by 3,000 native warriors. 10 Germans, among them von Zelewski (a uncle of Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski), as well as c. 300 Askari had fallen. The questions had now become so important to the editor that you were credited with an article. In the meantime it had been learned that the Wahehe belonged to the Mafiti. The Mafiti were known to the newspaper readers as they were among Bushiri's supporters. A whole series of tribes between the lakes and the coast were called Mafiti. The destruction of the Zelewski expedition by the Wahehe on 17 August 1891 was noted very carefully in France and exploited for propaganda purposes. Of 3 companies with 14 officers and NCOs was well as 320 askaris, only 4 German officers and non-commissioned officers, 2 effendis and 62 askaris escaped the slaughter against about 3,000 Wahehe. The Petit Journal (No. 45/1891) mocked the defeat of the German Schutztruppe against ‘a horde of Negroes’, which was worth a large, colored illustration on the cover page.”

The German East Africa Company (German: Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft, abbreviated DOAG) originated in 1884 as the Gesellschaft für deutsche Kolonisation (Society for German Colonisation) with the aim of trading in Africa. The German protectorate of Wituland (within modern Kenya) originated as a separate German sphere of influence in 1885. The driving force behind the founding of the colony was the pastor's son Carl Peters, who had the Society for German Colonization, which he had founded himself, commissioned him to take possession of areas in Africa. On 10 November 1884, Dr. Peters arrived in Zanzibar with companions. He traveled undercover, as his intentions should remain undetected to the British and the Sultan of Zanzibar. In April of 1885, the company leased the coastal strip opposite Zanzibar from Sultan Khalifa bin Said for 50 years. Once it had gained a foothold, Peters' new German East Africa Company acquired further lands in Tanganyika up to the Uluguru and Usambara Mountains. That met with opposition by Sultan Barghash bin Said of Zanzibar, who nevertheless had to give in after Peters had reached the official support by the Foreign Office in Berlin and a fleet of the Kaiserliche Marine under Konteradmiral Eduard von Knorr appeared off the Zanzibar coast. On 28 April 1888, Sultan Khalifah bin Said finally signed a treaty, ceding the administration of the Tanganyika mainland to the German East Africa Company.

This led to the "slave trader revolt" (German: Sklavenhändlerrevolte) along the coast of what is now Tanzania in 1888, the Arab elite feared for their slave and ivory trade, the Germans promised to abolish slavery. The representatives of the German East Africa Company were expelled or killed except for the establishments in Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam. In February 1889, Reichskanzler Otto von Bismarck intervened and appointed Lieutenant Hermann Wissmann a Reichskommissar (8 February 1888 to 21 February 1891) of German East Africa. Wissmann was only given one order: "Victory". On his way to East Africa, Wissmann hired a mercenary force in Egypt of mostly Sudanese soldiers from decommissioned units of the Anglo-Egyptian army to whom later in Mozambique a number, at first 100, of Zulus from South Africa under Hans von Ramsay were added, all Arabs and blacks under the command of 61 German officers and non-commissioned officers. In addition, a small group of East African Askaris who had previously been in the service of the DOAG were taken over. Later also 40 Somalis, two Turkish police captains and 20 Turkish police officers from the Ottoman Empire were added. Hundreds, other sources claim thousands, of bearers or porters (Träger) were hired.

The German forces, the Wissmann-Truppe, along with assistance by the German Navy, but also a sea blockade supported by the United Kingdom (Royal Navy), France, Kingdom of Italy and Portugal, all also opponents of slavery, fortified Bagamoyo, Dar es Salaam and retook Tanga and Pangani. Abushiri, on his flight to Mombasa, was eventually betrayed to the Germans in December 1889 and was sentenced to death in a court-martial and publicly hanged in Pangani. By an agreement of 20 November 1890, the German East Africa Company had to hand over Tanganyika's administration to the German government. It was, however, not until early 1891 that Wissmann was able report to Berlin that the rebellion had been fully suppressed. In 1891, the Wissmann-Truppe was taken over by the law of 22 March 1891 as an imperial protection troop (Kaiserliche Schutztruppe) in the Reich service after the German Empire replaced the D.O.A.G. and took over the sovereign duties. On 1 April 1891, Emil von Zelewski became the new commander (Oberführer), after his death (⚔) August Rochus Schmidt. Schmidt was also military advisory council to the governor. After being wounded so many times, he retired from the Schutztruppe and the African service as a complete invalid in 1892.

World War I

Loyal and brave Askari march to battle for Imperial Germany, the Kaiser and General von Lettow-Vorbeck, the "Lion of Africa" (German: Löwe von Afrika); For four years in German East Africa, with a force that never exceeded about 14,000 (3,000 Germans and 11,000 Reichsneger), he held in check a much larger force of 300,000 British, Belgian, and Portuguese troops. Essentially undefeated in the field, von Lettow-Vorbeck was the only German commander to successfully invade Imperial British soil during World War I. His exploits in the campaign have come down "as the greatest single guerrilla operation in history, and the most successful." In Africa and around the world through media, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck was known mystically as "The Bush Ghost" (German: Der Buschgeist).

The Battle of Ngomano in November 1917; A small force of Germans and Askaris (1,500–2,000 men) under Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck had recently won a costly victory against the British at the Battle of Mahiwa, and both ran very short of food and other supplies. As a consequence, the Germans had to push into Portuguese East Africa to the south, both to supply themselves with captured Portuguese materiel and escape superior British forces to the north. The battle was the breakthrough of the Schutztruppe at the Rovuma. The German casualties were light, 200 Portuguese were killed and wounded, 700 were captured.

When the war broke out, Germany’s limited colonial holdings were quickly invaded by the British, with the exception of German East Africa (today Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi). It was an area of 650,000 square miles of jungles, forests, and bush, where the lack of roads, and maps, the difficulty of the terrain, dangerous animals, and disease were all were formidable defensive weapons. There were the natural dangers—rhinoceroses, elephants, lions, crocodiles, mosquitoes, tsetse flies, chiggers, and ticks. Malaria and sleeping sickness rampaged through the colony, which was surrounded by enemy territory. British East Africa to the north, Northern Rhodesia to the southeast, the Belgian Congo to the east, and Portuguese East Africa to the south. In time, the Germans in Africa would find themselves facing the combined might of Great Britain and her Imperial forces from their Indian Empire, South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Belgium and Portugal. There were only two railroads in the German colony, one leading from the northern port of Tanga with a branch to Moschi at the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro (the Usambara line), through the most settled and developed part of the country. A second ran through the middle of the colony from the port of Dar-es-Salaam to Udjidi on the shore of Lake Tanganyika. The railroads were the key to transportation for the entire area. Roads were scarce and motor vehicles even scarcer. Cross-country transport meant porters carried goods on their heads in the finest safari tradition. Though using human carriers was the only option for moving through the bush, it was also a highly inefficient system. The farther the porters traveled, the more food and supplies they consumed. A flood of goods at the beginning of the supply line would become a trickle by its end. These long, narrow columns also required protection, both from enemy raids and the ever-present natural dangers. Even worse than the logistics problems was the weak and ineffectual British leadership. Epitomized by the rotund Brigadier-General Richard Wapshare, who had the distinctly unintimidating nickname of “Wappy,” British leaders in East Africa would prove to be unimaginative, lethargic, and lacking in foresight. The British leadership was fractured—often more involved in infighting amongst themselves than against the enemy. At the beginning of the war, the British Consul for East Africa, Norman King, reported breezily that “the Germans had no stomach for fighting,” and that the colony would allow the British to occupy it peacefully as long as they were guaranteed security from native unrest and naval bombardment. Unfortunately for King, the government in London had never signed up to such a political agreement, and the captain of the HMS Chatham, Sidney R. Drury-Lowe, mistakenly bombarded the port of Dar-es-Salaam in late October 1914 after receiving an erroneous report that the German light cruiser SMS Konigsberg had been spotted hiding in the harbor. Little physical damage was done, but the breaking of the supposed gentleman’s agreement further stiffened German resolve. Compared to this ineffectual group of colonial soldiers, the Germans could not have asked for a more capable leader than General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck. At 44 years of age, he was an experienced Prussian officer and a veteran of the Boxer rebellion of 1900-01 and the Herero campaign in German South West Africa in 1904-06. It was in South West Africa that Lettow-Vorbeck learned the techniques of guerrilla warfare. He had learned first-hand the classic principles of guerrilla warfare—mobility, surprise, avoiding pitched battles, self-discipline, strong command, and personal leadership. He also understood just how difficult it could be to completely defeat such a force. Lettow-Vorbeck knew that outright victory over the overwhelming resources of the British Empire was simply out of the question. Cut off from reinforcement or re-supply, and tremendously outnumbered, Lettow-Vorbeck and his army, or Schutztruppe, would be forced to live by their wits. His long-term strategy was to force the British to commit as many troops to East Africa as possible, for as long as possible, to prevent them from going to more important theaters. This was the only way they could have an impact on events in Europe, where the war ultimately would be decided.

The basic unit of the Schutztruppe was the company, which contained 16 to 20 German officers and 200 Askaris, or native soldiers. The Germans had learned quickly that Africans made excellent bush fighters. They required less supplies and—perhaps more important—could withstand the harsh climate. Each German company had a supply and transport sub-unit, two to four machine guns and 250 carriers, making it a fully self-contained operational unit. In late September, Lettow-Vorbeck seized the initiative by attacking the Uganda Railroad, which ran parallel to the German border from the port of Mombassa to Nairobi and on to Lake Victoria. This artery was vitally important to the British and threats to it could not be ignored—nor could they be stopped. The Germans used self-sufficient 10-man mounted patrols to cross the waterless wasteland that separated the two colonies. In one two-month period, 30 trains were derailed and 10 bridges destroyed. More and more British troops were sent to guard the railroads, making them unavailable for offensive operations and leaving the initiative firmly in Lettow-Vorbeck’s grasp. Faced with the surprisingly stiff resistance, the British attempted to use the same strategy in German East Africa that had worked well in the other German colonies: capture the seaports first, cutting the Germans off from outside supply, then advance steadily inland. The British expected the port of Tanga to be an easy target. From Tanga they could move up the northern railroad to Kilimanjaro, taking the most developed part of the colony and eliminating the bases for German raids on the Uganda railroad. The British put together an 8,000-man expeditionary force of inexperienced troops comprised of British territorial and Indian units. In command was Maj. Gen. Arthur Edward Aitken, an old Indian hand who was more concerned with his soldiers’ appearance than their battle readiness. “I will not tolerate the appalling sloppiness in dress allowed during the late war with the Boers,” he announced at his first staff conference. With no evidence or experience to support his claims, Aitken airily pronounced the quality of his opponents to be poor. He should have worried more about his own troops. Captain Richard Meinertzhagen, chief of British intelligence in East Africa, summed them up disgustedly as “the worst in India … rotten.” [...] The Germans reacted quickly and rushed reinforcements into the area by rail. Unused to fighting in the bush—they had not even known their ultimate destination until they set foot on African soil—the British troops quickly became separated and disorganized in the thick terrain, and the wily Askaris began to take a heavy toll. The leading British units, the 13th Rajputs and the 61st King George’s Own Pioneers, blithely walked into a machine-gun crossfire. Their African porters, showing better sense, threw down their supplies and ran back toward the beach. The Indian troops quickly followed, leaving behind several dead or wounded officers who had tried unsuccessfully to rally them. “These are jolly fellows to go fighting Germans with,” one disgusted British soldier observed. Lettow-Vorbeck, arriving that night, reconnoitered out front with a bandolier worn across his chest and a brace of pistols on his hips. As fresh reinforcements arrived, he personally placed them in line, regretting as he did that he had no artillery on hand with which to bombard the British beachhead a mile away. “Here in the brilliant moonlight, at such close range, the effect would have been annihilating,” he lamented. His counterpart, Aitken, was not so actively involved. Having set up headquarters in a white house on the bluff overlooking the bay, Aitken leisurely plotted the next day’s moves. He would attack en masse all along the front—no thought to any misdirection—but only after everyone had had “a good breakfast.” It was mid-morning on November 4 before the British resumed their advance. [...] Although outnumbered eight-to-one, Lettow-Vorbeck was eager to counterattack. As soon as new units arrived by train, he pushed them into action. “No witness will forget the moment when the machine guns of the 13th Company opened a continuous fire,” he recalled. “The whole front jumped up and rushed forward with enthusiastic cheers. In wild disorder the enemy fled in dense masses, and our machine guns, converging on their front and flanks, mowed down whole companies to the last man. Several Askaris came in beaming with delight with several captured English rifles on their backs and an Indian prisoner in each hand.” Other Indian troops, not so fortunate, were found later lying dead with their own bayonets protruding from their backs—a stark sign of Askari contempt.

In this, their first major battle in Africa, 8,000 British troops, armed with 16 machine guns and a mountain battery, had been decisively defeated by 1,000 Germans armed with four machine guns and no artillery. The British lost 800 dead, 500 wounded, and several hundred prisoners. German dead totaled 15 Europeans and 54 Askaris. The haste of the British evacuation led to a material windfall for the Germans. Left on the beach were 12 machine guns, 600,000 rounds of ammunition, hundreds of rifles, and enough coats and blankets to last the rest of the war. Alhough well-trained, the Schutztruppe began the war poorly equipped. Eight companies were equipped with 1871 model Mausers that still used black-powder cartridges, leaving a telltale cloud of smoke to give away their firing position. The spoils of victory at Tanga allowed three full German companies to be rearmed with much better British Enfields. Realizing the shock caused by the disaster at Tanga, Lettow-Vorbeck was quick to follow up his astounding success. Keeping a firm grasp on the initiative, the Germans attacked the British border town of Yassini in January 1915. It was near Tanga and could be used as a forward base for a land assault on that port. Its proximity to the German railroad system allowed nine companies to be rapidly transferred into the area. Lettow-Vorbeck’s plan at Yassini was to set up the British and put them in a position where a conventional response would be a serious mistake. The Germans quickly encircled the 250-man garrison and occupied the hills around the town. Repeated British relief attempts ran headlong into well-sited German machine guns, and the British were forced to withdraw after suffering heavy casualties. The canny Lettow-Vorbeck also used heat and thirst as weapons against the encircled British forces. On January 19, the British garrison at Yassini surrendered to a force half its size. Although an impressive victory, Yassini caused heavy losses for the Germans, too, losses Lettow-Vorbeck realized he could not afford to take if his forces were to last out a long war. For the time being, however, the British remained on the defensive, leaving the initiative firmly in Lettow-Vorbeck’s hands. [...]

Beginning in April 1916, the German colony was invaded from all directions. The British launched a two-pronged assault from the Kilimanjaro area, taking the developed northeast section of the colony and cutting the northern railroad. To add to Lettow-Vorbeck’s woes, another invasion was launched from Northern Rhodesia, while a Belgian column moved from north of Lake Tanganyika, and another British column headed south from Lake Victoria. In addition, seaborne landings took Dar es Salaam and other minor ports in the south in September, completely cutting off the Germans from the outside world. With their only choice retreat or fight major battles against tremendous odds, the Germans withdrew from the northern part of the colony. This set the pattern for the future campaign. Lettow-Vorbeck would slowly retreat, fighting just enough to weary and tax the British, always careful not to suffer too many casualties himself, taking every advantage of the terrain, and using every ounce of guile and wiliness he possessed to keep the enemy tied down in East Africa. [...] Isolated from the outside world, the Germans became increasingly self-reliant. Lettow-Vorbeck compared the improvised German economy to “the industry of the Swiss Family Robinson.” Motor fuel was made from coconuts. Boots were made from skins of cattle and game, the soles cut from captured saddles. A cottage weaving industry was established to produce cloth for uniforms. Quinine, the all-important drug used to treat malaria, was made from wood bark. Among the troops it was jokingly known as “Lettow-Schnapps,” and many complained that its flavor was worse than the disease. Any and all assets were put to work. The German cruiser Königsberg had holed up in the estuaries of the Rufiji River after sinking the British cruiser Pegasus in Zanzibar harbor. The British sent two 6-inch Monitors all the way from Malta to sink her, which they did in July 1915. The Germans salvaged the guns, built carriages for them, and used them until October 1917, when they finally gave out.

Unable to bring Lettow-Vorbeck to bay, the British steadily pursued the Germans. Pushed into the southeast corner of the colony, Lettow-Vorbeck faced an agonizing decision. With the Allies in control of almost the entire colony, there was no shame in surrendering after a well-fought campaign. But as long as a German army could remain in the field, his original mission of tying down British forces was still viable. Even after the long retreat, morale among the Askaris was still high. Lettow-Vorbeck was not one to give up and it was his indomitable spirit that the troops followed. “There is almost always a way out, even of an apparently hopeless position, if the leader makes up his mind to face the risks,” Lettow-Vorbeck said. Given the options, he decided to evacuate German East Africa and invade Portuguese East Africa. It was a plunge into the unknown. The Germans had neither maps nor any real idea of what they would face on they got there, but Lettow-Vorbeck was undaunted. “If we succeeded in maintaining the force on the new territory,” he reasoned, “the increased independence and mobility, used with determination against the less mobile enemy, would give us a local superiority in spite of the great numerical superiority of the enemy.” Accordingly, he reduced the size of his force to one that could be handled well in the bush. German doctors picked the healthiest men, not necessarily the best soldiers, since endurance would be the most important factor. He now commanded an army made up of 300 Europeans, 1,700 Askaris, and 3,000 native carriers. His force would be totally independent of supply dumps and could rely only on what it could capture. His reorganization complete, Lettow-Vorbeck crossed the Rovuma River on November 25, 1917, evacuating the German colony and invading Portuguese East Africa. The tone for the new phase of the campaign was set immediately. There was a Portuguese fort at Negomano less than a mile from where the Germans were crossing the river. Although his forces were still in the process of making the crossing, Lettow-Vorbeck had personally reconnoitered ahead and found some woods approaching the fort. He ordered an immediate attack using the cover of the woods. The 900-man Portuguese garrison did not put up much of a fight. The Askaris, however, went wild; Lettow-Vorbeck termed it a “fearful melee.” Now the Schutztruppe were not just merely the hunted—they were also the hunters. Among the plentiful supplies they captured were medicines, six machine guns, 250,000 rounds of ammunition, and enough rifles and uniforms to re-equip half the force. “With one blow,” said Lettow-Vorbeck, “we had freed ourselves of a great part of our difficulties.”

The successful start to the Portuguese East Africa incursion sent German morale soaring to new heights. Although the Portuguese maintained a relatively large and well-equipped army, their dispositions often made then easy pickings for the Germans. Portuguese rule was very unpopular, and their army of over 7,000 men was split into hundreds of small units throughout the country to maintain order. Native dissatisfaction and latent rebellion required local garrisons to conduct ceaseless patrolling. These poorly led small garrisons would seldom put up more than token resistance before fleeing into the bush, leaving their supplies and weapons to the feared German Askaris. By this point in the war the reputation of the Schutztruppe was a potent weapon in itself. Wherever Lettow-Vorbeck went, the British were forced to follow. The Germans moved south down the center of Portuguese East Africa, stretching the British supply lines from the coast and Nyasaland. Supply proved every bit as difficult for the British in the Portuguese colony as it had in the nearly road less stretches in the southern part of the German colony. The farther inland the Germans went, the less fit the British were to attack them successfully. Lettow-Vorbeck used the terrain and environment in a constant war of attrition on the British. Every man who came down with malaria or fell out from hunger was one more who would not require an Askari bullet. An old Boer serving with the Germans summed it up best. “This is a funny war,” he said. “We chase the Portuguese, and the English chase us.” Many Askaris had brought their families with them, and numerous children were born during the march. Bearers, women, and children were taught to march at the same pace as the soldiers. They marched six hours a day, with a half-hour rest period every two hours. This strange parade could cover 15 to 20 miles a day through roadless territory.

Rapid mobility was absolutely essential for the survival of the Schutztruppe. The Germans practiced making boats from bark until they could be completed in less than two hours. This allowed for the rapid crossing of the many rivers and waterways without having to carry boats along with them. The march was arduous, and the seriously wounded could not be carried along for long. Lettow-Vorbeck was faced with yet another difficult choice. “There was nothing for it but to collect our invalids from time to time, turn them into a complete field hospital, under a single medical officer, and take our leave of them finally.” Nothing could be allowed to slow down the Schutztruppe. As always, the indomitable will of the commander led the army. Once when he was fever ridden and nearly blind, Lettow-Vorbeck led his exhausted horse into camp. His adjutant noted: “I am not sure which one more resembled a skeleton. One thing is certain. The horse will not last the next 24 hours, but the colonel will.” [...] The Germans drove almost the entire length of the Portuguese colony, raiding food supplies and capturing small Portuguese garrisons along the way. But food was only one of Lettow-Vorbeck’s requirements for maintaining the fighting ability of his force. Ammunition was becoming critically low, and its procurement became a top priority. But first something had to be done about the tightening net of British pursuit. A British force had landed at Port Amelia and was nearing a linkup with a second force from Nyasaland. Lettow-Vorbeck first struck the Nyasaland force, then turned and inflicted a sharp defeat on the Port Amelia force, once again striking two converging columns from interior lines. The pursuit thus temporarily neutralized the Germans continued their search for ammunition. [...]

Having run the entire length of Portuguese East Africa with British columns in hot pursuit, Lettow-Vorbeck reversed course and headed north, hoping that the British would think he was headed for Tabora. On September 28, 1918, the Schutztruppe crossed back into German East Africa, rapidly moving north. Tabora was an important town, located on the central railway, and was therefore a linchpin in the British supply lines. It was also the best recruiting area for the Askaris before the British had occupied it. The last thing the British wanted was to allow Lettow-Vorbeck to replenish his ranks. The British rushed forces from all over the colony to protect Tabora and try to bring the German army to bay. Having once again forced the British to dance to his tune, Lettow-Vorbeck veered sharply to the west, avoiding the British concentration around Tabora and invading instead the British colony of Northern Rhodesia. Always with supplies first in mind, the German force headed toward land as yet untouched by war, where there would be nothing stronger than local police forces to oppose them. The Askaris were in fine spirits, fully armed, and leading a herd of 400 cattle. On November 9, the Germans took Kasama in Northern Rhodesia. They were pleased to find full supply depots, only lightly defended, as they moved farther into Rhodesia. They had more supplies than they could carry and had also captured quinine stocks to last them to June 1919. The Schutztruppe was ready to carry on the war indefinitely. According to Lettow-Vorbeck, “The men were well armed, equipped and fed, and the strategic situation at the moment was more favorable than it had been for a long time.” On November 13, Germans reached the Chambezi River. There they received the stunning news from the British commander that an armistice had gone into effect two days before. World War I was over. The Schutztruppe marched into Abercorn two weeks after the end of the war and formally surrendered on November 25, 1918. At the surrender, Lettow-Vorbeck’s force contained 155 Europeans, 1,168 Askaris, and 3,000 other Africans, including 819 women. The weapons they turned over included a Portuguese field gun, 37 machine guns (30 of them British), 1,071 English and Portuguese rifles, 40 rounds of artillery ammunition, and 208,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. Although they had been ready to continue the war indefinitely, the signs of their 3,000-mile trek were all around them. Many men were wearing bandages made from bark, and Lettow-Vorbeck himself was wearing captured boots slit over the toes to make them fit.

Overall, the Germans lost 2,000 killed, 9,000 wounded, and 7,000 prisoners or missing, along with some 7,000 African carriers dead, primarily from disease. The British suffered 10,000 dead, 7,800 wounded, 1,000 missing or captured, and a staggering 50,000 African carriers dead—once again showing how badly Lettow–Vorbeck had stretched British supply lines. Belgian and Portuguese casualties totaled 4,700. Great Britain alone spent £72,000,000, as opposed to the Kaiser’s government, which had not even paid its East African soldiers. The fact that the men would fight on without pay for years on end was testament to the loyalty they had for their indomitable leader. British soldiers could claim to fight for God, king, and country. The Askaris had fought for Lettow-Vorbeck. With their help, Lettow-Vorbeck had accomplished his original aim of tying down as many Allied troops as possible. With a troop total of 3,000 Europeans and 11,000 Askaris, he had successfully faced down, at one time or another, some 300,000 Allied soldiers deployed against him from August 1914 to November 1918. His exploits earned the respect of friend and foe alike. Even England’s Queen Mary voiced her admiration. Lettow-Vorbeck finished the war Germany’s only undefeated general, one who under the harshest of conditions still had managed to fight a gentleman’s war. As one English officer willingly admitted, “We had more esteem and affection for him than for our own leaders.” Met with a hero’s welcome when he disembarked at Rotterdam, Lettow-Vorbeck was characteristically humble: “Everyone seemed to think that we had preserved some part of Germany’s soldierly traditions, had come back home unsullied, and that the Teutonic sense of loyalty peculiar to us Germans had kept its head high even under conditions of war in the tropics.” Indeed it had.

German East Africa after the First World War

The end of the First World War did not put a stop to the suffering of civilian populations caught up in the conflict. The plight of Germans, Russians, Austro-Hungarians and Italians during the 1920s are well documented. Among the major theatres of war, the least discussed among historians is German East Africa (what is now Burundi, Rwanda and mainland Tanzania). To understand the challenges faced in the region following the war, we must first look at the carnage experienced during it by indigenous peoples. The German census in 1911 set the approximate native population of German East Africa at 7.5 million; 1913-14 estimates varied between 7.7 and 7.8 million.

By 1921, the British census listed the native population for the same area at approximately 4.1 million. There are many reasons for this drastic drop. While the number of combat dead on both sides was relatively low – somewhere between 16,000 and 18,000 native soldiers were killed – the number of labourers and non-combatants who died is significantly higher. The only reliable way to transport supplies across the colony was with porters hired locally.

In 2001, the historian J.P. Cann estimated the losses among porters at between ‘100,000 to 120,000 on the German side and 250,000 on the Allied side’. That is out of approximately one million who were recruited and conscripted. These porters died of a combination of illnesses, exhaustion and malnutrition. Disease was also a major factor in the civilian death toll, with anywhere from 10 to 20 per cent of the population killed between 1914 and 1918. The worst single instance was the flu epidemic of 1918, which killed around 200,000 in German East Africa and more than 1.5 million across sub-Saharan Africa. As the historian Daniel Steinbach has noted, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of civilian dead were largely unrecorded and ‘unnoticed by the world’.

Population

On 1 January 1904, the European population of the protectorate numbered 1,437. One year later, the population had increased by 30% to 1,873 during the preceding year. Germans numbered 1,324 followed by 110 Greeks, 83 South African Afrikaners, 78 Frenchmen, 67 Englishmen and 60 Italians. On 1 January 1907, the European population numbered 2629, a 7% increase over the previous year. A 25% drop in the number of children was attributed to emigration by large families of Trek Boers from the Moschi district to neighboring British East Africa. The native population was estimated to be 9 to 10 million and was reportedly in decline. It was believed that as many as 75,000 native men had died during the preceding year from war, famine or disease.

The German census in 1911 set the approximate native population of German East Africa at 7.5 million; 1913-14 estimates varied between 7.7 and 7.8 million. By 1921, the British census listed the native population for the same area at approximately 4.1 million. There are many reasons for this drastic drop. While the number of combat dead during WWI on both sides was relatively low – somewhere between 16,000 and 18,000 native soldiers were killed – the number of labourers and non-combatants who died is significantly higher.

Leadership

Three German emperors of the "Second Reich" from 1871 until 1918

Commander Hermann von Wissmann (centre), to his left his deputy Dr. Karl Wilhelm Schmidt, to his right Karl Friedrich Freiherr von Gravenreuth (⚔) and other officers of the Schutztruppe in East Africa

Schutztruppe garrisons

Emperor

• 1884–1888 Wilhelm I
• 1888 Friedrich III
• 1888–1914 Wilhelm II

Administrator (1885-1891)

• 27.5.1885 to 8.2.1888: Dr. Carl Peters
  • When Peters returned to Berlin with his contracts during the Congo Conference and threatened an agreement with the Belgian King Leopold, the Reichskanzler gave in for domestic political reasons and issued a letter of protection signed by Kaiser Wilhelm I on 27 February 1885. This letter of protection legitimized the occupation of East African areas under the name Deutsch-Ostafrika after the name Petersland, which had been considered by Peters' friends, had been humbly rejected by him. Peters had been appointed Reich Commissioner for the Kilimanjaro Region (Kilimandscharogebiet) in 1891, but he was recalled to Germany in 1892 due to disputes with Governor Julius von Soden, but mainly because of a scandal around his native lover Jagodia. He served in the Imperial Colonial Office from 1893 to 1895, while official accusations were brought against him of excesses in regard to his treatment of the native population, contrary to enemy propaganda, something that Germans did not tolerate. He evaded the final sentence and further criminal prosecution by relocating to London, where he occupied himself with schemes for exploiting parts of Rhodesia and Portuguese East Africa.
    • Dr. Peters, as sometimes claimed, was never Reichskommissar for German East Africa, but administrator 1885–1888. On 18 March 1891, after returning to Africa, he was named "Reichskommissar for the Kilimanjaro Region" in Moshi, however subordinate to governor Freiherr von Soden. In 1892, he was recalled and returned to Germany. After three investigations, in 1897, he was officially deprived of his commission with the loss of his title and his pension rights. However, in 1905 Kaiser Wilhelm II awarded him the title of “retired Reichskommissar” and from 1914 he also received an annual pension.
• 8.2.1888 to 21.2.1891: Hermann Wissmann (Reichskommissar or Imperial High Commissioner)
  • In fact, with the arrival of Reich Commissioner Wissmann, control had already passed to the German state. During 1890 the terms were negotiated under which the Reich would also formally take ownership of the DOAG. On 1 July 1890, the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty was signed between Germany and Great Britain. The treaty regulated the surrender of the North Sea island of Helgoland and the Caprivi Strip (now part of Namibia) to the German Reich, while Wituland (now part of Kenya) and the claims to Uganda were ceded to Great Britain. Wissmann reportedly treated the natives with respect: he insisted on fairness, respect for customs, and use of Swahili (the native language). Some consider him “Germany’s Greatest African”, and because of that, several monuments were erected to commemorate his accomplishments.

Governor (1891-1918)

• 14.2.1891 to 15.9.1893: Julius Freiherr von Soden
  • 18.3.1891 to 1892 (de facto) / 1897 (de jure) Dr. Carl Peters as Reichskommissar for the Kilimanjaro Region
• 15.9.1893 to 25./26.4.1895: Friedrich Radbod Freiherr von Scheele
• 25./26.4.1895 to 3.12.1896: Hermann Wissmann
• 3.12.1896 to 12.3.1901: Eduard von Liebert
• 12.3.1901 to 15.4.1906: Gustav Adolf Graf von Götzen
• 15.4.1906 to 22.4.1912: Georg Albrecht Freiherr von Rechenberg
• 22.4.1912 to 14.11.1918: Dr. Albert Hermann Heinrich Schnee
  • From 1912 to 1918 Schnee served as the last Governor of German East Africa. His tenure was marked by the outbreak of the First World War. As Governor he held supreme military command. However, he soon disagreed with the commander of the Schutztruppe, General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, on defensive strategy. Ultimately von Lettow-Vorbeck prevailed with his guerrilla tactics and increasingly assumed control of operations. Schnee, besides his administrative responsibilities, also had to reconcile his family, and according to Wilhelm Methner, who served under the governorship of Schnee as First Secretary, "the wife of the governor, who was English by birth, suffered the bitter fate of seeing the sons of her fatherland and of her adoptive country in battle against each other. This brave and upright woman had to bear with much hostility". On 2 March 1919, Schnee and von Lettow-Vorbeck led the returning fighters from East Africa through the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin.

Military

Commanders of the Schutztruppe

• 1.4.1891 to 17.8.1891 Leutnant Emil von Zelewski (1854–1891)
• August Rochus Schmidt (1860–1938) took over the Schutztruppe as Oberführer in representation
• 1892 to 1893 Office not occupied
• 23.10.1893 to 25.3.1895 Oberst Friedrich Radbod Freiherr von Scheele (1847–1904)
• 25.5.1895 to 17.8.1897 Oberstleutnant Lothar von Trotha (1848–1920)
• 22.9.1897 to 12.3.1901 Generalmajor Eduard von Liebert (1897–1901)
• 12.3.1901 to 14.4.1906 Major Gustav Adolf Graf von Götzen (1866–1910)
• 28.5.1907 to 13.4.1914 Oberstleutnant Kurt Hans Julius Freiherr von Schleinitz (1859–1928)
• 1914 to 1918 Oberstleutnant Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870–1964)

Gallery

• 

  German East Africa landscape

• 

  The harbour at Dar-es-Salaam circa 1910.

• 

  General Post Office at Dar-es-Salaam.

• 

  Dar-es-Salaam Government Hospital.

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  Hotel Burger in Dar-es-Salaam, 1914.

• 

  Roman Catholic Cathedral at Dar-es-Salaam.

• 

  Lutheran Church in Dar-es-Salaam.

• 

  The floating dock at Dar-es-Salaam, 1907.

• 

  Light cruiser SMS Königsberg in Dar-es-Salaam harbour, early 1915.

• 

  Government school at the port of Bagamoyo.

• 

  The Post Office (left) at Bagamoyo.

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  Cable railway at Usambara. (The ordinary Usambara railway line ran from Tanga to Moschi.)

• 

  Fort at New Langenburg.

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  Kaiserhof Hotel at Tanga.

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  A steamship at Muansa, on Lake Victoria.

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  German armed steamer SS Graf von Götzen on Lake Tanganyika.

• 

  The colony's Schutztruppen at barracks in Dar-es-Salaam.

• 

  Askari native troops in German East Africa.

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  Artillery unit repulsing the failed British landings at Tanga.

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  Schutztruppen - Askaris with German officers ready for the British invaders.

• 

  The colony's Schutztruppen march towards Lake Tanganyika for raids into British East Africa, 1915.

• 

  General Lettow-Vorbeck and Governor Schnee, both fluent in the Swahili language.

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  German East Africa coins from 1916.

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  Proposed flag (1914)

• 

  Proposed Coat of Arms (1914)

Further reading

• Paul Kohlstock: Ärztlicher Ratgeber für Ostafrika und Tropische Malariagegenden, Verlag von Hermann Peters, Berlin 1891
• Karl Peters: Die Gründung von Deutsch-Ostafrika, Berlin 1906
• Carl Friedrich Christiansen: „Durch!“ – Mit Kriegsmaterial zu Lettow-Vorbeck, Verlag für Volkskunst, Stuttgart 1918
• Dr. Heinrich Schnee (de): German Colonization - Past & Future – The Truth About the German Colonies, London 1926 (PDF)
• Ton Dietz: A postal history of the First World War in Africa and its aftermath – German colonies. IV Deutsch-Ostafrika / German East Africa (GEA), African Studies Centre, Leiden (Netehrlands) 2015
• Prof. Bruce Gilley: In Defense of German Colonialism – And How Its Critics Empowered Nazis, Communists, and the Enemies of the West, 2019
  • German edition: Verteidigung des deutschen Kolonialismus, 2021
  • See also Colonialism Reconsidered from Jesse Russell, 2022

External links

Encyclopedias

• German East Africa, Encyclopædia Britannica