Galician Offensive

Kerensky Offensive
Part of the Eastern Front during World War I
A pencil sketch of a Russian soldier fleeing his trench as Central Powers bayonets rise over it. The failed offensive was Russia's last of the war.
Date 1–19 July 1917 Location Galicia, Central Europe Result Central Powers victory
Belligerents
Russian Provisional Government	German Empire Austria-Hungary
Commanders and leaders
Aleksei Brusilov Aleksei Gutor Lavr Kornilov	Leopold of Bavaria Felix Graf von Bothmer Max Hoffmann Eduard von Böhm-Ermolli
Strength
XI, VII, VIII Armies 900,000	German South Army k. u. k. II. and III. Army 260,000
Casualties and losses
60,000 to 200,000 42,726 deserters	Unknown

The Galician Offensive (also known as July Offensive; German: Kerenski-Offenive) was the last Russian offensive in World War I. It took place in July 1917. With the failure of the Kerensky Offensive, the Provisional Russian Government had lost its last military trump card.

Despite the circumstances of his appointment as Minister of War, Alexander Kerensky supported the war, and launched his own offensive on July 1, 1917, a drive in Galicia towards the Austro-Hungarian fortress city of Lemberg, under the command of General Alexsei Brusilov, now army chief of staff. The Russians drove back the Austro-Hungarian troops in the first two days of the battle and in a renewed attack on the 6th, but a counter-attack on July 19, 1917 under Generals Graf von Bothmer commanding German forces and Hermann Baron Kövess von Kövessháza (1854–1924) leading Austro-Hungarians, defeated the Russians. By August 3, the demoralized Russians were driven from Galicia along a front extending from Poland into Romania with a loss of 200,000 casualties, 40,000 of them killed.

History

The offensive was ordered by Alexander Kerensky, Minister of War in the Russian provisional government, and led by General Brusilov. Such a decision was ill-timed, because, following the February Revolution, there were strong popular demands for peace, especially within the army, whose fighting capabilities were quickly deteriorating.

Discipline within the Russian Army had reached a point of crisis since the Tsar's abdication. The Petrograd Soviet's Order No. 1 tremendously weakened the power of officers, giving an overriding mandate to "soldier committees". The abolition of the death penalty was another contributing factor, as was the high presence of revolutionary agitators at the front including Jewish and bolshevik agitators, who promoted a defeatist agenda (and whom Kerensky tolerated considerably more than conservative agitators). Riots and mutineering at the front became common, officers were often the victims of soldier harassment and even murder. Furthermore, the policy of the new government towards the war effort was one of fulfilling obligations towards Russia's allies, as opposed to fighting for the sake of total victory, thus giving soldiers a less credible motivation to fight.

However, Kerensky hoped that an important Russian victory would gain popular favour and restore the soldiers' morale, thus strengthening the weak provisional government and proving the effectiveness of "the most democratic army in the world", as he referred to it.

Offensive

Starting on 1 July 1917, the Iperial Russian troops attacked the Austro-Hungarian and German forces in Galicia, pushing toward Lviv. The operations involved the Russian 11th, 7th and 8th Armies against the Austro-Hungarian/German South Army (General Felix Graf von Bothmer) and the Austro-Hungarian 7th and 3rd Armies.

Initial Russian success was the result of powerful bombardment, such as the Central powers never witnessed before on the Russian front. Most of the artillery used was from Britain and Japan. The Austrians did not prove capable of resisting this bombardment, and the broad gap in the enemy lines allowed the Russians to advance without encountering any resistance. But the German forces proved to be much harder to root out, and their stubborn resistance resulted in heavy casualties amongst the attacking Russians. As Russian losses mounted, demoralization of infantry soon begin to tell, and the further successes were only due to the work of cavalry, artillery and special "shock" battalions, which general Kornilov had formed. The other troops, for the most part, refused to obey orders. Soldiers' committees discussed whether the officers should be followed or not. Even when a division did not flatly refuse to fight, no orders were obeyed without preliminary discussion by the divisional committee, and even when the latter decided to obey orders it was usually too late to be of any use.

The Russian advance collapsed altogether by July 16. On July 19 the Germans and Austro-Hungarians counterattacked, meeting little resistance and advancing through Galicia and Ukraine as far as the Zbruch River. The Russian lines were broken on July 20, and by July 23, the Russians had retreated about 240 kilometers (Vinny). "The only limit to the German advance was the lack of the logistical means to occupy more territory".

While the Russians were immobilized in confusion, the Central Powers were able to organize their counter-attack. The Germans quickly transfer six divisions through their highly effective railway from French and Belgian fronts. The Germans, with fighting ability much superior to that of the Austro-Hungarians, exerted tremendous pressure on the Russian lines. To the south, the Austro-Hungarian 7th Army were able to probe the loosely held positions of the Russians and made a concerted attack to push the Russians back. Altogether, the Central Powers were able to break the Russian defense and advance 145 km within 10 days. During the retreat, the Russians suffered heavy losses: casualties included 40,000 killed, and 20,000 wounded. At this point, the Russian army was so devastated that they were not able to launch any counter-attack any more.

Aftermath

The Russian provisional government was greatly weakened by this military catastrophe, and the possibility of a jewish bolshevik coup d'état became increasingly real. Far from strengthening Russian army morale, this offensive proved that Russian army morale no longer existed. No Russian general could now count on the soldiers under his command actually doing what they were ordered to do. This offensive helped the start of the July Days, and also affected the situation in Romania. Russo-Romanian forces, which broke the Austro-Hungarian front at Mărăşti in support of the Kerensky Offensive, had to halt their advance.

One further fight took place between the Germans and the Russians in 1917. On 1 September 1917, the Germans attacked and captured Riga. The Russian soldiers defending the town refused to fight and fled from the advancing German troops.

Historical assessment

Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Tsarist Empire in August 1916 made Russia's situation even worse: in one fell swoop, the front was extended by 400 kilometers. Instead of a relief, Romania became a burden. By the end of 1916 it was already under the control of the Central Powers. Russia's final offensive actions in the summer of 1917 were led by Alexander Kerensky, the hapless February revolutionary. However, the “Kerensky Offensive” shared the fate of the “Brussilov Offensive”: poorly prepared, failed early. In the end, the German army liberated Riga and was about to march on St. Petersburg. However, the dissolution of the demoralized Russian army and the October Revolution made further German advances unnecessary.

In March 1918, Russia accepted the peace demanded by Germany in Brest-Litovsk. Poland, the Baltics, Finland and Ukraine were liberated. While a civil war broke out in Russia, which cost the country more lives than the years of the World War, Germany was able to concentrate on the theater of war at the Western Front, which was considered to be much more important. 80 divisions of the Imperial German Army were now free for this.

Casualties

The Russian losses rose rapidly; the 8th Russian Army alone had lost 40,000 casualties since 6 July. Signs of dissolution undermined the morale of the divisions ordered to attack, and many soldiers refused to continue fighting. The Russian army suffered such heavy losses and it was clear from many incidents of desertion, sabotage and mutiny that the Russian army was no longer ready to attack. Austro-Hungarian casualties were also high, German losses in comparison low.

External links

• Kerenskioffenive