Walter Lohmann

Walter Lohmann
Weser-Zeitung, 3 May 1930
Birth date	30 December 1878(1878-12-30)
Place of birth	Bremen, German Empire
Death date	29 April 1930 (aged 51)
Place of death	Rome, Italy
Allegiance	German Empire (to 1918) Weimar Republic
Service/branch	Kaiserliche Marine Reichsmarine
Years of service	1897–1928
Rank	Kapitän zur See
Battles/wars	World War I
Awards	Iron Cross
Relations	∞ Elsa Müller-Melchers

Walter Lohmann (sometimes wrongfully written Walther; 30 December 1878 – 29 April 1930) was a German naval officer, finally Kapitän zur See (Captain at Sea) of the Reichsmarine. He must not be confused with Vizeadmiral Walter Georg Lohmann.

Life

Lohmann entered the German Navy on 7 April 1897 and received his training on board of trhe SMS "Charlotte", then on the SMS "Stosch". He was then commanded to the academic Marineschule. As a Leutnant zur See he returned to the school ship (Schulschiff) SMS "Charlotte". On board, also as Leutnant zur See, was Adalbert Ferdinand Berengar Viktor Prinz von Preußen (1884–1948), son of Kaiser Wilhelm II. On 19 September 1900, the long training trip to the Mediterranean started, during which Moroccan ports, Alexandria and Corfu were called at, among other places. On 17 December 1900, the "Charlotte" received orders to go to Málaga and carry out salvage work on the SMS "Gneisenau", which had sunk the day before. On 22 December, the "Charlotte" reached the Spanish port and continued the work begun by the British Devastation. The last bodies were recovered and secret documents and valuables were also dived from the wreck. After a brief interruption due to the transport of the Moroccan envoy to Tangier, the work in Malaga was completed by 12 January 1901. The "Charlotte" then visited Italian ports and was back in Kiel on 9 March 1901. On 18 April 1901, the new 1901 officer candidates (Seekadetten) crew boarded the "Charlotte". Before the usual voyages in the Baltic Sea, the ship participated in the surveying work in the Adlergrund, which was due to the running aground of the liner SMS "Kaiser Friedrich III." had become necessary. The training trip, which started on 14 August 1901, went again to the Mediterranean Sea. Among other things, Piraeus, Constantinople and Trieste were called at. The journey ended on 16 March 1902 in Kiel.

In 1902, Lohmann served as a company officer in the division for young apprentices in the first year of training to become sailors (Kompanieoffizier der Schiffsjungendivision) in Friedrichsort. Afterwards, he served on the SMS "Frauenlob", then, in 1903, on the gunboat SMS "Tiger" stationed in Tsingtao as part of the German East Asia Squadron (Ostasiengeschwader). When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904, she was stationed in front of Chemulpo to evacuate German nationals if necessary. In August 1904, the badly damaged Russian battleship "Tsesarevich" and three destroyers sought refuge in the German naval base at Tsingtao following the Russian defeat in the Battle of the Yellow Sea. As Germany was neutral, the East Asia Squadron interned "Tsesarevich" and the destroyers. On 13 August, the Russian ships restocked their coal supplies from three British steamers, but the armored cruiser SMS "Fürst Bismarck" and the protected cruiser SMS "Hansa" cleared for action to prevent them from leaving the port. The two cruisers were joined by "Tiger" and her sister "Luchs" and the cruisers "Hertha" and "Geier".

Returning home, he served with the II. Werftdivision (shipyard division) in Wilhelmshaven, where he became leader of the 1st Company in 1907. He then served on the SMS "Zähringen" in 1908 an on board of the school ship SMS "König Wilhelm" in 1909. From 1910 to 1912, he was company commander in the German colony of Tsingtau (leader of the 1st Company/Matrosen-Artillerie-Abteilung Kiautschou under Korvettenkapitän Friedrich Richter). In 1913, he served on the battleship SMS "Prinzregent Luitpold" and would become her artillery officer in 1914, serving as such at the beginning of WWI. In March 1918, he was transferred to the Reichsmarineamt, where he worked in the sea transport department (Seetransportabteilung) from December 1918 after the end of the war.

As a representative of the sea transport department in the General Navy Office, Lohmann took part in the 1919 maritime armistice negotiations and was appointed head of the sea transport department (BS) on 28 October 1920 within the Marineleitung. From the chief of the naval administration, Admiral Paul Behncke, he experienced a clear promotion of his person and the area of ​​work. Lohmann's efforts consisted in equipping his office with numerous, sole decision-making powers. On 8 March 1920, Lohmann was promoted to frigate captain. During the events of the Kapp Putsch in 1920, he was on an official trip in London. He was promoted to sea captain on 1 January 1922. On his initiative, a design office was opened in the spring of 1922 to specialize in the construction of submarines (U-Boote).

He worked very closely with the Chief of Staff of the Naval Command Lieutenant Commander Wilhelm Canaris. At the beginning of 1927, the first information emerged about a significant financial imbalance in the sea transport department. In several articles in the Berliner Tageblatt from 8 August 1927, it became apparent to the public that slush funds existed in his area of ​​work, bribes were paid and secret armament orders were being carried out. As a result, on 13 August 1927, the President of the Reich Audit Office, Friedrich Saemisch, was commissioned with the relevant investigations. As a result of random checks carried out, Lohmann was relieved of his post on 23 March 1928. His previous deputy, Rudolf Lahs, succeeded him as head of department. On 31 March 1928, Lohmann retired from the Navy with a reduced pension.

Lohmann Affair

The Weimar Republic's attempts in the twenties to circumvent the Versailles restrictions on its armed forces produced clandestine operations which in their financing, cover devices, and hazards of exposure present a close parallel with intelligence operations. One such series of undercover research and development projects, carried out by a Captain Walther Lohmann of the German Naval Transportation Division, got out of hand and became a source of acute embarrassment to the Weimar Ministry of Defense. The affair was hushed up, and in more recent times has been virtually overlooked by historians. Sufficient material is now available, however, for a scrutiny of Lohmann's work, its oddities and blunders, and for an account of the way the German Cabinet successfully veiled its true nature after some of the clandestine activities had been exposed in the press. Walter Lohmann, the son of a one-time director of the North German Lloyd shipping line, served inconspicuously as a non-combat logistics specialist during the European war of 1914-1918. He won recognition in navy circles afterward, however, for his work on a subcommission which negotiated the disposition of the German merchant fleet and for his direction of shipments of emergency food supplies to Germany. He also managed the return from overseas of German war prisoners. In 1920, while on the first of two trips to Leningrad to negotiate with the Russians regarding the release of captured German merchant ships, he met the comely German-born Frau Else Ektimov [Elke Ekimoff], destined later to play a role in his downfall. He subsequently arranged for the return of the lady to Germany and for her support. In October 1920 he assumed command of the Naval Transport Division of Navy headquarters in Berlin, a post concerned primarily with logistical matters. For this reason, and also because he enjoyed the complete trust of Admiral Paul Behnke, then commander in chief of the Navy, he was given full charge in early 1923 of the disbursement of the Navy's "black" funds reserved for clandestine purposes.

Initially, these funds included large sums--amounting in dollars to at least 25 million--obtained from the sale of warships and submarines scrapped in 1919 and 1920 at the order of the Allied Powers. Later, some two and a half million were added as the Navy's share of the so-called "Ruhr funds," monies voted by the Reichstag and used to strengthen the armed services above Treaty limit at the time of the French occupation of the Ruhr. Subsequently, smaller sums totaling about two and a quarter million were obtained or diverted from other sources. Most of this money was transmitted to recipients through a Lohmann-supported bank, the Berliner Bankverein, which acted as a middleman between the Naval Transport Division and the various projects funded. Only one inspector, a man of Lohmann's own choice, was assigned to audit the funds, and he had no authority to question the wisdom or validity of the captain's disbursements. His presence afforded a partial check against improper book-keeping and ordinary waste, but none to hinder Lohmann from supporting whatever projects he chose. Admiral Behnke and Minister of Defense Otto Gessler, trusting Lohmann to use the money for worthwhile undertakings, seem to have given him carte blanche, an opportunity which appealed to his Hanseatic spirit. Between 1923 and 1927 Lohmann financed nearly all of the clandestine and semi-clandestine projects of the Navy. Most of these were established with the initial concurrence of his superiors, and many required the closest cooperation with several divisions of the naval staff; but some were founded and supported solely on the captain's initiative without the knowledge of even the commander in chief of the Navy. This independent activity was protected by the necessity for strict secrecy in clandestine operations and by Lohmann's extremely broad powers. The projects which dealt with aircraft and submarine design and development were for the most part soundly conceived, well executed, and extremely important for the future development of the Navy and the Luftwaffe. With subsidies from Lohmann, three German shipyards operated a highly successful submarine design bureau in The Netherlands which maintained contact with Navy headquarters through a dummy firm known as Mentor Bilanz. The "Dutch" bureau, Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw, designed a submarine which Lohmann and Captain Wilhelm Canaris (later to become the Abwehr chief of ambivalent loyalties) in 1926 arranged to have built at Cadiz in Spain. The purpose was to train German technicians and to develop a prototype medium-size submarine, which among other features had torpedo tubes designed to eliminate the large bubble of air that normally betrayed a submarine's position when a torpedo was fired. Lohmann's work in aircraft development was equally significant. The firms of Heinkel, Dornier, and Rohrbach enjoyed his subsidies, and in 1926 he purchased outright the Casper Aircraft Company to obtain facilities for the type-testing of "commercial" aircraft which closely resembled the fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance planes being built abroad by such firms as Boeing, Vickers, and Douglass. By 1927, Germany had several successful prototypes, and the Swiss subsidiary of Dornier was about to embark on the design and development of the "DO X" flying boat, a twelve-engine giant larger even than the famous Boeing Clippers of Pan-American, to meet the requirement for a patrol seaplane capable of landing and refueling at sea. Only an unacceptably low service ceiling made it necessary to abandon this design. The training of airmen was at the same time not overlooked. Battle-experienced pilots of the Lohmann-financed Severa flying service based at Noordnay and Holtenau conducted tactical exercises with the fleet and trained a dozen young naval officers each year in the art of flying.

As Lohmann's list of projects grew--including also such things as the secret construction of motor torpedo boats and subsidies to various small-boat shipyards and yachtsmen's associations--his ambition increased proportionately. By about 1926 he seems to have become convinced that he could perfect a massive structure of clandestine projects financed by profitable commercial ventures bolstering the rapidly dwindling "black" funds. He then stepped into another world, the world of commerce and business, where his successes were lamentably few. He had become the victim of Masslosigkeit-- gross intemperance. Two projects which attempted to combine money-making with what might today be termed "defense-related research" bordered on the fantastic. One company was founded to exploit an experimental method of raising sunken ships by surrounding them with ice, and another sought to extract motor fuel from potatoes. These accomplished nothing, and both aroused much public ridicule when they were later exposed. Another device, a coal-pulverizing machine, came to grief in the course of experiments and the Lohmann-financed company which sponsored it went bankrupt. But it was the Berliner Bacon Company which came to be described by German Socialists as the most oderiferous of Lohmann's schemes. This project was initiated primarily as a money-maker in the spring of 1926. Lohmann proposed to wrest from the Danes the lucrative British bacon market by offering a German product cured by a new process especially for the Englishman's palate. He had incidentally in mind that the fast refrigerator ships he hoped to acquire for the bacon trade would be useful in wartime as troop transports. His ambitions, however, exceeded his ability to analyze the British market potential, and by mid-1927 his company was bankrupt. Lohmann's downfall stemmed from his relations with the Phoebus Film Company, in 1927 the third largest producer of motion pictures in Germany. Beginning in 1924 Lohmann granted subsidies to this firm on condition that it produce films of a "national" character designed to stimulate the "fatherland consciousness" of the German people. He also hoped to use its overseas offices to establish an intelligence network in former enemy countries where Germany was not allowed a naval attaché. The captain probably had personal reasons for supporting' Phoebus as well. Prior to his association with the company he had become a close personal friend of one of the directors, and afterward a member of a hunting club organized by him. Through this man Lohmann secured for his friend Frau Ektimov a position with Phoebus at a salary of 1,000 marks a month, enough to enable her to support her aged mother and young son in comfort. Frau Ektimov, employed for "representation," did no work, and she had apartments in a house purchased by Lohmann. Lohmann's personal relations with her are nevertheless officially said to have been above reproach, motivated solely by a desire to help her; and honi soit qui mal y pense. He also seems not to have appropriated any of the "black" funds for his own use. Between 1924 and 1927 Lohmann provided Phoebus, a company capitalized at approximately $1,000,000, with a total of over $2,500,000. He informed his superiors of only one of five separate grants, a government-guaranteed loan from the Girocentral Bank in Berlin in March 1926. In order to obtain their signatures on this guarantee, Lohmann resorted to a strategem, informing them that the Lignose Company, a producer of raw film, had also guaranteed the loan and that in the event of default it would stand the loss instead of the government. He neglected to add that he had in effect bribed one of Lignose's officials with a $2,500 "negotiating fee," and that he had given this man a written assurance that Lignose would not have to pay. In the early half of 1927 he arranged two more government-guaranteed loans which he kept secret from his superiors by affixing his own signature in the name of the Reich. Despite this massive aid, Phoebus continued to lose money. In 1927 it was in such serious financial difficulties that it failed to convene its regular annual stockholders' meeting or issue a financial report. By August disaster was impending for both Lohmann and Phoebus. The company was falling behind in payments on its loans, and penalties were mounting rapidly. None of Lohmann's various money-making projects had paid off, and the "black" funds were near exhaustion.

Kurd Wenkel, one of the financial writers of the Berliner Tageblatt, a liberal daily of high quality, had been following the declining fortunes of the German film industry with close attention. He was well aware of the financial condition of Phoebus, and by mid-July had begun to suspect that Phoebus enjoyed official support. At about this time he became acquainted with a former director of the company, Isenburg, who had resigned in disgust in 1926 and knew of Lohmann's dealings with Phoebus, of the several government-guaranteed loans, and of Lohmann's relations with Frau Ektimov. Evidently for reasons of spite he told all this to Wenkel, who took care to check the story independently and then in articles on 8 and 9 August created a sensation by exposing the shameful scandal. Wenkel, however, was apparently not aware of Lohmann's real clandestine mission. For him the Phoebus relationship constituted an attempt by the Navy to strengthen right-wing elements in Germany. His articles briefly mentioned some of Lohmann's other activities, including subsidies to a boatbuilding yard, but only as attempts to help industries that had some war potential. One of his disclosures, however, had it been pursued, could have exposed most of Lohmann's work--his connections with the Berliner Bankverein. Lohmann had bought a controlling interest in the Bankverein in March 1925 in order to use it as a covert financing agency for his projects. But the private bankers who remained shareholders were greatly displeased at the depreciation of its stock caused by failures such as that of the Berliner Bacon Company, and their discontent made them serious security risks. If any of them emulated the vindictive Isenburg and talked to the press, there was grave danger that the Lohmann affair might become not only a scandal but a revelation of serious German violations of the Versailles Treaty. The German Cabinet and Chancellor Marx were therefore anxious to smooth the affair over as rapidly as possible. Lohmane was suspended from office, an official Cabinet inquiry was begun, and a retired official of the Prussian State judiciary, was placed in charge of Lohmann's office for the purposes of investigation and audit. Publicity was curtailed and Wenkel silenced by pressure on the Berliner Tageblatt. Two radical journals continued to carry articles through late August, September, and October, but neither had good enough contacts in navy or industrial circles to make further damaging disclosures. Chancellor Marx consulted directly with various important party leaders to insure silence in political quarters.

Death

During a business trip to Italy on behalf of the Schütte-Lanz Werke, Walter Lohmann died of a heart attack on 29 April 1930 (other sources state 30 April) in Rome at the age of 51. He was in Rome on invitation of Mussolini, who he should meet and negotiate the organization and funding of an air connection from Germany to South America by airships which should lead through Italy.

Family

Like his future wife, Walter Lohmann came from a respected Bremen business community; his father was the wealthy merchant Johann Georg Lohmann (1830–1892), director at North German Lloyd, who had promoted the policy of fast steamers, his mother was Clarissa, née Frost, born on 22 January 1838 in Stepney/London, daughter of James John Frost, cordage (rigging) manufacturer in London. He had eight siblings, his older brother Alfred (1870–1919) was President of the Chamber of Commerce in Bremen during the First World War.

Marriage

He was married to Elsa, née Müller-Melchers (b. 7 September 1881). They had three children, among them Adalbert Lohmann, technical engineer and inventor (among other things 1936 a method for determining direction in aviation and, together with his assistant Udo Stepputat, pilottone, a special synchronization signal recorded by analog audio recorders designed for use in motion picture production, to keep sound and vision recorded on separate media in step.)

Promotions

• Kadett / Officer Candidate (7 April 1897)
  • 17 April 1899 renamed Seekadett
• Seekadett / Officer Cadet at Sea (27 April 1898)
  • 17 April 1899 renamed Fähnrich zur See
• Leutnant zur See / 2nd Lieutenant at Sea (23 September 1900)
• Oberleutnant zur See / 1st Lieutenant at Sea (8 October 1902)
• Kapitänleutnant / Captain Lieutenant (27 April 1907)
• Korvettenkapitän / Corvette Captain (14 July 1914)
• Fregattenkapitän / Frigate Captain (8 March 1920)
• Kapitän zur See / Captain at Sea (1 January 1922)

Awards and decorations

• Silver Medal of the Order of Distinction (Ottoman Empire)
  • Silberne dem Imtiaz-Orden affiliierte Medaille (TNJmsM/TsM)
• Order of the Medjidie (Ottoman Empire), 4th Class (TM4)
• Iron Cross (1914), 2nd and 1st Class
• Military Merit Order (Bavaria), 4th Class with the Crown and Swords (BMV4mKr⚔/BM4mKr⚔)
• Hanseatic Cross of Bremen (Bremisches Hanseatenkreuz; BH)
• Oldenburg Friedrich-August-Kreuz, 2nd and 1st Class (OFA1/OK1)
• Prussian Long Service Cross (Dienstauszeichnungskreuz)
• Austrian Decoration for Services to the Red Cross (Ehrenzeichen für Verdienste um das Rote Kreuz), Officer Cross of Honor (Offizierehrenkreuz)

Further reading

• Ernst Schneller: Phoebus-Skandal – Korruption und Geheimrüstungen, Berlin 1928
• Bernd Remmele: Die maritime Geheimrüstung unter Kapitän z. S. Lohmann, 1997 (read online)
• Ian Ona Johnson: The Lohmann Skandal, in: "Faustian Bargain – The Soviet-German Partnership and the Origins of the Second World War", Oxford University Press, 2021