Grenzschutz Ost

Border guard advertising poster: "Officers, NCOs and Men protect your homeland in the East"; Lieutenant General Groener reported: "The Poles will, as soon as we weaken our border defenses, immediately advance into West Prussia and Upper Silesia and create a fait accompli ("accomplished fact"). The reinforcement of their Wehrmacht by Józef Haller's divisions will benefit them in this. If, as I still dare to hope, most of Posen is returned to us, we must still have the necessary forces to occupy it. I see very bleak prospects for the East if we do not at least regain the Warta Line. If our border defenses are weakened, we must expect that the agitation of the population of the remaining Posen area and of the Posen refugees employed in border defense would increase considerably; a veritable gang war in the province could be the result. With regard to East Prussia, the dismantling of the border defenses would completely hand the country over to Bolshevism, for the governments in Lithuania and Latvia cannot stop Bolshevism. Bolshevism would then also assert itself in the German territory east of the Vistula and create new opportunities for the Poles. Border protection for East Prussia cannot be abandoned until we know what will become of Russia.”

The Grenzschutz Ost (English: Border Protection East; also: Border Defense East or Eastern Border Guard), originally called Army High Command "Homeland Defense East", formed part of the Provisional Reichswehr and was divided into the Army High Commands North, headquartered in Bartenstein/East Prussia (April 1919: 103,000 men), and South, headquartered in Breslau (April 1919: 106,000 men). Grenzschutz Ost included Freikorps and other units (volunteer associations, temporary volunteers, Upper Silesian Self-Defense, etc.) to protect Germany's eastern borders, especially against Poland, but also Czechoslovakia.

History

Hans Tröbst of the Marine Brigade “Ehrhardt” wears, among other things, the Badge of Merit of the V Army Corps, the Baltic Cross, the “German Order Shield in Remembrance of the Eastern Border Guard” (with Teutonic Knight's Cross) on his upper arm and, above the Iron Cross First Class, the Black Army Cross of the Volunteer German-Russian Western Army (Freiwillige Deutsch-Russische Westarmee) (Graf Keller Cross).

A young officer of the Grenzschutz Ost

Deutschritterkreuz, Steckabzeichen und Dekoration für die Ordensspange, Grenzschutz Ost.jpg

On 15 November 1918 (other sources state as early as 12 November), the Supreme Army Command established the High Command Homeland Protection East (Oberkommando Heimatschutz Ost) . Volunteer units (Freikorps) were formed to secure the border. But it was also for defense against the murderous Polish "Workers' and Soldiers' Councils," who killed and harassed Germans, occupied government buildings and post offices, and demanded that Germans speak only Polish from then on. It was a Polish-Bolshevik reign of terror, but the Poles once again underestimated the fighting strength and resilience of the German people.

Following protests from the Polish government, the name was changed to Central Border Defense East. At the end of 1918, the Polish Uprising began in Posen, where the 5th Army Corps was also stationed. The German Reich government issued a call for volunteers on 9 January 1919. for defense in the Border Protection East or Eastern Border Guard. The territories were gradually recaptured. After the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the fighting continued for some time. The term "Eastern Border Guard" refers to all volunteer units and Freikorps that were deployed to secure the borders of the eastern territories of the German Reich.

Freikorps

The Freikorps were, at least officially, not formally part of the Grenzschutz Ost, but they were closely associated and often operated in similar roles. The Freikorps were volunteer paramilitary units formed in Germany after World War I, primarily to combat internal unrest and defend German interests in contested border regions. The Grenzschutz Ost was a more organized, semi-official force established by the German government to secure eastern borders, particularly against Polish forces in areas like Silesia and Posen during the post-war territorial disputes.

The Grenzschutz Ost, or "Border Defense East," was established by the German government after World War I to protect the eastern borders, particularly against Polish forces in areas like Silesia and Posen, during the chaotic post-war territorial disputes. As a semi-official force tied to the Provisional Reichswehr, it operated in a militarized context, often alongside volunteer units like the Freikorps. In such settings, it was common for military and paramilitary organizations to issue awards or decorations to recognize service, bravery, or contributions, especially given the intense and often dangerous nature of border conflicts.

Many Freikorps units, such as the Freikorps Oberland or Eiserne Division, were deployed in the eastern territories alongside or as part of Grenzschutz Ost operations, especially during the Silesian Uprisings (1919–1921). They shared similar goals of defending rightful German claims against Polish insurgents and Bolshevik influences. However, the Freikorps were typically more autonomous, operating under loose government oversight, while Grenzschutz Ost was more directly tied to the Weimar Republic’s military structure. In practice, the lines blurred: Freikorps fighters often joined Grenzschutz units or were temporarily integrated into them for specific campaigns, like the defense of Upper Silesia.

As time progressed, the relationship evolved. Many former Grenzschutz Ost members later joined Freikorps in the Baltikum, indicating a fluidity between the two. However, by October 1919, many Grenzschutz Ost units were officially dissolved, and the Reichswehr maintained structures for rapid mobilization, sometimes involving Wehrverbände that included former Freikorps members. This suggests that while the Freikorps were initially part of Grenzschutz Ost, their roles became more distinct as the Weimar Republic sought to formalize border protection under regular military and police forces.

Based on the historical evidence, it is clear that the Freikorps were part of the Grenzschutz Ost, particularly in the initial phases after World War I, where they fought collectively under its banner in eastern border conflicts. However, their inclusion was functional rather than formal, reflecting their role as volunteer units within a broader collective effort. The autonomy of the Freikorps and the evolving nature of Grenzschutz Ost over time added layers of complexity, but the evidence leans strongly toward their involvement as part of the Grenzschutz Ost framework.

General Groener before the Scheidemann Cabinet

After "Reich Prime Minister" (again Reich Chancellor in August 1919) Philipp Heinrich Scheidemann's welcome, Lieutenant General Groener addressed the cabinet meeting of 24 April 1919 and reported on the situation in the East:

I felt a great need to use this very moment to once again provide a comprehensive overview of our military situation. The task assigned to the High Command in the East was threefold:

1. To create a secure wall along the Bolshevik front in front of the East Prussian border, if possible along the shortest line, and behind it, a disease-free zone between the wall and our border. A far-reaching offensive was not intended from the outset. To the extent that offensive measures were carried out, they served only to establish the shortest line. Simultaneously with these military actions, the internal consolidation of East and West Prussia took place.

2. On the Posen Front, a strong defensive was necessary to repel further Polish attacks, while at the same time preparing for a recapture of the Posen Province and providing troops for rapid assembly on both flanks. Linked to this, as with the first task, was internal consolidation, particularly of the Pomerania Province.

3. On the Silesian Front, a reliable defense of Upper Silesia and the County of Kłodzko had to be created against Polish and Czech incursions, specifically on three sides: the Posen Province, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Internal consolidation of the situation in Silesia was also necessary if we wanted to operate successfully militarily abroad.

The Northern Army Command has taken over the security of the borders against the Bolsheviks, and the Southern Army Command has taken over the security of the borders against the Poles and Czechs; both tasks have been fully accomplished. We are currently prepared for all eventualities that may still occur in the East and have thus created a solid foundation for the conduct of foreign policy in the East. After the beginnings of border protection had already been organized before the arrival of the Supreme Army Command in Kolberg [Note: 14 February 1919], the main focus since then has been on organizing the individual units for tactical and operational tasks; previously, the units were not yet operationally capable troops. It was necessary to reorganize the command structures, to bring the troops firmly back into the hands of the leaders, and to increase the forces. I can report that this task has now also been achieved. [...]

In the north, we have advanced our position to the Gulf of Riga, but do not intend to take Riga [Note: On 22 May 1919, Riga was liberated by troops of the Iron Division and the Baltic Home Guard.]. We are positioned almost on the shortest line. Our attacks to establish the shortest line caught the Bolshevik troops unprepared; they were also weakened by the simultaneous attacks in Estonia. Resistance was sparse. The Old Russian troops have always evaded concerted attacks; however, the Bolshevik Latvian regiments, which also launched vigorous counterattacks near Riga, have proven themselves admirably. We observe the Soviet tactic of first unnerving the enemy with propaganda and only then attacking, as was successfully achieved in Ukraine. The seizure of Ukraine has also brought the Soviet troops a significant increase in war material, thus alleviating their ammunition shortage. The commissioning of the Bolshevik fleet can be expected in the near future. The situation on our Bolshevik front is currently somewhat relaxed, particularly due to Admiral Kolchak's attack in the east. However, it can also be assumed that the Soviets do not expect any success from an invasion of our country now that we have organized the resistance and regained control of the troops. Unfortunately, the Spartacist agitation in East and West Prussia has still not been completely suppressed, but it is very difficult to catch the agitators in time. If we succeed in keeping East and West Prussia healthy, we will be able to repel any Bolshevik attacks. However, if we reopen the door to agitation, I cannot guarantee this. The decision regarding the military situation in the coming weeks will be political. Either we remain on the defensive against the Bolsheviks, or we undertake an offensive, but only in cooperation with our former enemies. However, we do not value the participation of French troops; they would be unsuitable anyway. An offensive could be envisaged as follows: Polish troops would move toward Minsk, and our forces would be deployed alongside American, and possibly also English, forces at Vilna, Daugavpils, and Riga.

The English fleet would have to advance against Riga, as well as Reval, Narva, and St. Petersburg, and land troops there. The time for such a concentric operation would come in May. It would pursue the goal of gaining control of the Vilna-Petersburg railway. Whether such an offensive operation is in the interests of America and England is debatable.11 That such considerations played a certain role within the Entente is undeniable. The Entente had already planned to advance against the Bolsheviks from southern Russia, but this operation never materialized. It is not my task to judge what effect such an offensive would have on Moscow and the existence of the Soviet government. Should such a joint operation not materialize, I am in favor of a strict defensive. For them, it would be militarily expedient to shorten our front and, to this end, withdraw our lines on the right wing to Augustow-Kalvarija west of Kovno. I would like to ask the Foreign Office to state whether there are any political reasons against this. Militarily, we would have the advantage of being able to gain forces to reinforce our left wing. From a military point of view, there are no objections to abandoning Lithuania, since the High Command has no military interest in the border states. According to our observations, Lithuania is not yet viable; the government is not friendly to us, but cannot yet do without our assistance. There is a danger that the French will gain considerable influence if we leave there. From a military point of view, it is immaterial whether Grodno falls into the hands of the Lithuanians or the Poles. The High Command is not yet sufficiently informed about the latest political situation in Latvia; the High Command has no interest in the political situation, since its mission is purely military. The most important thing for us is that there is peace behind the front, that any Bolshevik contamination is prevented, and that we can smoothly regulate supplies. The overthrown government, which was not very pro-German, seems to have sought strong support from the Entente. On the Polish front, fighting is once again increasing, despite the armistice, due to the fault of the Poles. [...]

The League of Posen Refugees, which has continually bombarded the High Command with petitions, poses a certain threat to our situation in the East. While these people's agitation is understandable, we have calmed them as much as possible, and I hope that the League will not allow itself to be carried away by any rash actions. On the Czech front, détente continues; events in Hungary have withdrawn Czech troops, and the unrest in the German-Bohemian border region is also holding the Czechs back from undertaking operations against us. At present, there is no particular danger to the Kłodzko Pocket. Based on the above, my military conclusions are as follows: We must maintain the military strength we have gained in the East for as long as possible. Only when we know what the outcome will be can we consider reducing border defenses, depending on the domestic and foreign political situation. I would not consider the abandonment of territories associated with the dismantling of border guards to be expedient at this time, either, because the German volunteers who joined the local armed forces have been contractually promised settlement in these territories. A premature dismantling of border guards would be a very risky move, not only for extra-political reasons; for domestic political reasons as well, I urgently request that the secure conditions we have created in the East not be undermined. The East is in the hands of the government, and we will ensure that it remains in its hands. The government can now rule the East again; it has the power to enforce its orders there. Do not shake this power! It will only be exercised according to the demands and wishes of the government.

Leadership

Operational command was exercised by the Supreme Army Command (OHL), whose headquarters had been located in Kolberg since February 1919. In addition, a “Central Border Protection East” (Zegrost) was set up at the War Ministry (whose office was located in Bellevue Palace in Berlin), which was responsible for organizational issues.

Supreme Army Command (OHL) HQ: Kolberg/Pomerania Chief of the High Command: Generalfeldmarschall Paul von Hindenburg First Quartermaster General: Lieutenant General Wilhelm Groener
Central Office for Border Protection East (Zegrost) Headquarters: Berlin (Bellevue Palace) Chief of Staff: Major Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr von Willisen
AOK North HQ: Königsberg, later Bartenstein/East Prussia Commander-in-Chief: General of the Infantry Ferdinand von Quast Chief of Staff: Major General Hans von Seeckt/Colonel Wilhelm Heye	AOK South HQ: Breslau/Silesia Commander-in-Chief: General of the Infantry Kurt von dem Borne Chief of Staff: Major General Fritz von Loßberg

Badge of Merit of the V. Army Corps

"The Badge of Merit of the V. Army Corps in the Eastern Border Guard was established by order of the General Command on 9 April 1919. [...] The commander of the V. Army Corps from 2 January to 20 September 1919 was Carl Georg Wichura, General of the Infantry, based in Posen. The V. Army Corps was subordinate to the 8th Army Inspectorate in Berlin. The General Command of the V. Army Corps consisted of the following units in 1919: Brigade for Special Use 5 consisting of the 1st and 2nd Reserve Infantry Regiments, Reserve Artillery Regiment 9 and the Dohna Free Corps. Furthermore, the Silesian Volunteer Corps consisting of 2 volunteer brigades, an artillery brigade, a dragoon regiment, the Schill Jäger Regiment, a Life Cuirassier Regiment and the The Dieskau Volunteer Foot Artillery Battalion of the 6th Army Corps was also part of the 10th Volunteer Infantry Division. This included the 19th, 20th, and 77th Volunteer Infantry Brigades, the 10th Field Artillery Brigade, the 5th Foot Artillery Regiment, and the Royal Hunter Volunteer Regiment. Other units included the 1st and 10th Uhlan Regiments, the Görlitz Freikorps, and the 1st–5th People's Militia Battalions."^[1]