Erich von Manstein
From Metapedia
Erich von Manstein (November 24, 1887–June 10, 1973) served the German military as a lifelong professional soldier. He became one of the most prominent commanders of Germany's armed forces (Wehrmacht). During World War II he attained the rank of Field Marshal (Generalfeldmarschall) and was held in high esteem by his fellow officers as one of the Wehrmacht's best military minds.
He was the initiator and one of the planners of the Ardennes-offensive alternative in the Invasion of France in 1940. He received acclaim from the German leadership for the victorious battles of Perekop Isthmus, Kerch, Sevastopol and Kharkov. He commanded the failed relief effort at Stalingrad and the Cherkassy pocket evacuation. He was dismissed from service by Adolf Hitler in March 1944, due to his frequent clashes with Hitler over military strategy.
In 1949 he was brought on trial in Hamburg for war crimes, which convicted him of "Neglecting to protect civilian lives" and for using scorched earth tactics denying vital food supplies to the local population. He was sentenced to 18 years in prison, which was later reduced to 12. After release from British prison in 1953, he became a military advisor for the West German Government.
[edit] Early Life
Von Manstein was born Fritz Erich von Lewinski in Berlin, the tenth child of a Prussian aristocrat, artillery general Eduard von Lewinski (1829–1906), and Helene von Sperling (1847–1910). Hedwig von Sperling (1852–1925), Helene's younger sister, married Lieutenant General Georg von Manstein (1844–1913). The couple were not able to have children, so it was decided that this tenth, unborn child would be adopted by his uncle and aunt. When he was born, the Lewinskis sent a telegram to the von Mansteins which stated: You got a healthy boy today. Mother and child well. Congratulations.
Not only were both Erich von Manstein's real and adopted father Prussian Generals, but his mother's brother and both his grandfathers had also been Prussian Generals (one of them leading a corps in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71). In addition, he was closely related to Paul von Hindenburg, the future Generalfeldmarschall and President of Germany. Thus, his career in the Prussian army was assured from birth. He attended the Lycée in Strasbourg (1894–99), a territory which had become part of the German Empire after the war of 1870–71. He spent six years in the cadet corps (1900–1906), in Plön and Groß-Lichterfelde and joined the Third Foot Guards Regiment (Garde zu Fuß) in March 1906 as an ensign. He was promoted to Lieutenant in January 1907, and in October 1913, he entered the War Academy.
During World War I, von Manstein served on both the German Western Front (Belgium/France 1916: Attack on Verdun, 1917–18: Champagne) and the Eastern Front (1915: North Poland, 1915–16: Serbia, 1917: Estonia). In Poland, he was severely wounded in November 1914. He returned to duty in 1915, was promoted to captain and remained as a staff officer until the end of the war. In 1918, he volunteered for the staff position in the Frontier Defense Force in Breslau (Wroclaw) and served there until 1919.
[edit] World War II
On August 18, 1939, in preparation for Operation Fall Weiß, the German invasion of Poland, von Manstein was appointed Chief of Staff to Gerd von Rundstedt’s Army Group South. Here he worked along with von Rundstedt’s Chief of Operations, Colonel Günther Blumentritt in the development of the operational plan. Von Rundstedt accepted von Manstein’s plan calling for the concentration of the majority of the army group’s armored units into Walther von Reichenau’s 10th Army, with the objective of a decisive breakthrough which would lead to the encirclement of Polish forces west of the River Vistula. In von Manstein’s plan, two other armies comprising Army Group South, Wilhelm List’s 14th Army and Johannes Blaskowitz’s 8th Army, were to provide the flank support for Reichenau’s armored thrust towards Warsaw, the Polish capital.
Privately, von Manstein was lukewarm about the Polish campaign, thinking that it would be better to keep Poland as a buffer between Germany and the Soviet Union. He also worried about an Allied attack on the West Wall once the Polish campaign started, thus drawing Germany into a two-front war.
Launched on September 1, 1939, the invasion began successfully. In Army Group South’s area of responsibility, armored units of the 10th Army pursued the retreating Poles, giving them no time to set up a defense. The 8th Army prevented the isolated Polish troop concentrations in Łódź, Radom and Poznań from merging into a cohesive force. Deviating from the original plan that called for heading straight for the Vistula and then proceeding to Warsaw, von Manstein persuaded von Rundstedt to encircle the Polish units in the Radom area. The plan succeeded, clearing the bulk of Polish resistance from the southern approach to Warsaw.
On September 27, 1939, Warsaw formally surrendered, although isolated pockets of resistance remained. That same day, Hitler ordered the Army High Command, led by General Franz Halder, to develop a plan for action in the west against France and the Low Countries. The different plans that the General Staff suggested were given to von Manstein and Gerd von Rundstedt and together they formalised an alternative plan for Fall Gelb (Case Yellow). This plan received Hitler's attention in February 1940 and finally his agreement.
By late October, the bulk of the German Army was redeployed to the west. Von Manstein was made Chief of Staff of von Rundstedt’s Army Group A in western Germany. Like many of the army's younger officers, von Manstein opposed Fall Gelb, criticizing it for its lack of ability to deliver strategic results and the uninspired utilization of the armored forces, which may have come from OKH's inability to influence Hitler's planning. Von Manstein pointed out that a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan, with the attack directed through Belgium, was something the Allies expected, as they were already moving strong forces into the area. Bad weather in the area caused the attack to be cancelled several times and eventually delayed into the spring.
During the autumn, Von Manstein, with the informal cooperation of Heinz Guderian, developed his own plan; he suggested that the panzer divisions attack through the wooded hills of the Ardennes where no one would expect them, then establish bridgeheads on the Meuse River and rapidly drive to the English Channel. The Germans would thus cut off the French and Allied armies in Belgium and Flanders. Von Manstein's proposal also contained a second thrust, outflanking the Maginot Line, which would have allowed the Germans to force any future defensive line much further south. This second thrust would perhaps have avoided the need for the Fall Rot second stage of the Battle of France.
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht originally rejected the proposal. Halder had von Manstein removed from von Rundstedt's headquarters and sent to the east to command the 38th Army Corps. But Hitler, looking for a more aggressive plan, approved a modified version of von Manstein's ideas, which today is known as the Manstein Plan. This modified version, formulated by Halder, did not contain the second thrust. Von Manstein and his corps played a minor role during the operations in France, serving under Günther von Kluge's 4th Army. However, it was his corps which helped to achieve the first breakthrough during Fall Rot, east of Amiens, and was the first to reach and cross the River Seine. The invasion was an outstanding military success and von Manstein was promoted to full general and awarded the Knight's Cross for suggesting the plan.
In February 1941, von Manstein was appointed commander of the 56th Panzer Corps. He became involved in Operation Barbarossa, serving under General Erich Hoepner. Attacking on June 22, 1941, von Manstein advanced more than 100 miles in only two days and seized two vital bridges over the Dvina River at Dvinsk.
In September 1941, von Manstein was appointed commander of the 11th Army. Its previous commander, Colonel-General Eugen Ritter von Schobert, had perished when his plane landed in a Russian minefield. The 11th Army was tasked with invading the Crimea, capturing Sevastopol and pursuing enemy forces on the flank of Army Group South during its advance into Russia. Hitler also intended to use the Kerch Peninsula to land forces in the Caucasus. This, however, would turn out to be tougher than anticipated.
The initial objective was to force a crossing over the Isthmus of Perekop, which connects the Crimean peninsula to the mainland. The area was defended by about 50,000 Soviet troops, out of a total of 230,600 Soviet troops on the whole of the Crimea peninsula, while the Germans attacked with six Infantry, one panzergrenadier and two mountain divisions, supported by six Romanian brigades. The assault began on September 24, 1941. Shortly before it began, a Soviet counterattack ordered by Stalin both cost the Soviets men and interrupted work on fortifications.
After the initial German breakthrough, the rest of the Perekop area had to be secured. Von Manstein, deprived of three divisions needed elsewhere, launched the assault on 16 October 1941 against eight rifle and four cavalry divisions, most of whom had been evacuated from Odessa and were thus under-strength. The assault on Perekop was frontal in nature, the axis of advance was on three narrow strips of land, defended by troops with prepared defensive positions. Though numerically inferior, the Soviets had local numerical tank and air superiority. After ten days of bitter fighting, the defensive line was overrun on 28 October, with the German forces eagerly pursuing the retreating Soviet forces into Crimea. The Germans quickly seized control over the whole peninsula, and by 17 November, only the city of Sevastopol held out. Manstein claimed that these operations resulted in over 100,000 Soviet troops taken prisoner, and many killed. Actual Soviet losses of all kind totaled 63,860.
The first attack on Sevastopol was launched on October 30, 1941. Von Manstein, overly impressed by its weaker fortifications, attacked the southern flank, only to discover the terrain in this area prohibitively difficult. On December 4, the local Soviet command reported that the attack had been checked. A renewed attempt was launched from the north on December 17. By then, winter had set in and the Luftwaffe was fogged out. On December 21, just as the Germans were preparing for their last push, the Soviets launched a spoiling attack, forcing them back. Shortly thereafter the Soviet winter offensive began, producing the Wehrmacht's so-called "Winter Crisis."
Just over a week later, on December 26, 1941, the Soviets landed on the Kerch straits, and on December 30, executed another landing near Theodosia, where 41,930 troops were initially committed. These landings were soon reinforced. Only a hurried withdrawal from the Kerch straits, in contravention of Manstein's orders, by 46 Infantry Division under General Hans Graf von Sponecks command prevented a collapse of the eastern part of the Crimea, although the division lost most of its heavy equipment. This situation forced von Manstein to cancel a resumption of the attack on Sevastopol and send most of his forces east to destroy the Soviet bridgehead. In that sense, it may have been a blessing in disguise for the Germans as conditions for a continued attack were impossible. The situation was stabilized by late April 1942.
Operation Trappenjagd, launched on May 8, 1942, aimed at expelling the Russian forces from the Kerch peninsula. Opposing the German forces were 17 rifle (infantry) divisions, along with several independent brigades. The Germans had 7 infantry divisions and a panzer division. Approximately one third of the German forces were Romanian. After feinting against the north, the 11th army attacked in the south, and the Soviets were soon reduced to fleeing for the Kerch straits. The operation was completed successfully on 18 May. Manstein claimed that next to no Soviet troops were evacuated across the straits, leading to 170,000 Soviet troops taken prisoners and some 100,000 killed, while Soviet sources claim that some 140,000 were evacuated, though many of these were infirm. Krivosheev puts total Soviet losses at 176,566.
